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1Chapter 1
IMMIGRANT NETWORKS, TRADE CREATION, AND TRADE
DIVERSION
I derive a simple gravity model with producer matching and use data on foreign-born population
located in 19 OECD-member countries to estimate the impact of immigrant links on trade. The
immigrant links are assumed to inuence trade through three mechanisms. 1) Immigrants located
in a given host country facilitate trade by forming joint ventures with agents in their country of
origin. 2) Immigrantsjoint ventures reduce the probability of forming a joint venture between host-
countrys natives and agents in the immigrants country of origin . 3) The remaining immigrant
communities in a given host country divert a fraction of joint ventures that would have otherwise
been created between hosts natives and agents from the concerned country of origin.
The empirical estimates suggest a statistically signicant impact of immigrant links on trade.
The trade-facilitating channel declines with the GDP of source country and is generally smaller than
estimates from preceding studies. There is furthermore some empirical evidence that immigrant
links change trade ows between countries. The net e¤ect on total trade of a 10-percent increase
in the overall immigrant stock varies between -0.12-1.18 percent for host countries and -6.99-2.58
percent for source countries in the sample.
Keywords: international trade, immigration, informal trade barriers
JEL classication: F22, O24
1.1 Introduction
Informal trade barriers have become one of the central points in the debate launched by
McCallums mystery of the missing trade (McCallum, 1995), i.e., the nding that nations
2tend to trade too much intranationally and too little internationally. Particular attention
has been directed towards insu¢ cient information on available trading opportunities and
imperfect contract enforcement. Insu¢ cient information about foreign partners seems to be
pronounced especially in more di¤erentiated industries where product characteristics vary
along multiple dimensions and price happens to be only one of several decision criteria.
The resulting higher search costs can then make otherwise e¢ cient cross-border matches
unprotable (Rauch and Trindade, 2003; Casella and Rauch, 2003). Similarly, in the absence
of e¢ cient contract enforcement when trade parties originate from di¤erent jurisdictions,
potential contract renegation and losses accrued by the a­ icted party decrease the incentives
to engage in trade and, again, might prevent otherwise successful international matches
(Greif, 1994).
Some social networks seem to be well equipped to deal with both kinds of informal trade
barriers. These networks, often dened by common ethnicity or religion, can provide useful
information and trade contacts to their members and/or employ some sort of collective
punishment mechanism that could substitute for inadequate enforcement institutions. In
particular, numerous studies on informal barriers examine the impact on trade of immigrant
networks (e.g., Head and Ries, 1998; Gould, 1993; Girma and Yu, 2002). The results of
these studies consistently support the notion that immigrant links indeed facilitate bilateral
trade between host and source countries.
The present paper o¤ers two extentions to the existing literature. First, it evaluates the
potential role of immigrants in trade diversion, i.e., shifts in trade ows due to immigrant
links to country of origin. Second, it derives a simple matching framework relating trade,
immigrant links and the output of their country of origin, and calculates the GDP-adjusted
estimates of immigrantsoverall impact on trade by host and source country.
The paper argues that in a situation when exporters decide between several competing
destination markets, the combination of pervasive informal trade barriers and country-
specic knowledge possessed by immigrants might actually lead to the diversion of trade.
Consider a German machinery producer who wishes to export to either Vietnam or Thailand.
Other things equal, if the informal trade barriers are uniform across both countries and trade
is still protable, the producer will be indi¤erent as to where to export. If, on the other hand,
3the producer is of Vietnamese ancestry, or perhaps employs Vietnamese o¢ cers in its trade
department, the contacts and knowledge of local conditions might bias the export choice in
favor of Vietnam.1 Now assume such a decision has been made by a larger number of rms.
While from the perspective of Germany the total exports do not change (or they increase
somewhat if immigrants are more e¢ cient in nding suitable matches), its bilateral trade
with Thailand becomes lower than it would have been in the absence of immigrant networks.
In this case, trade diversion from Thailand occurs due to a lost fraction of transactions that
would have been realized by otherwise indi¤erent exporters.
A study on o¤shoring in the apparel industry (Gere¢ , 1999) provides a related empirical
observation; it describes the case of Taiwanese rms channeling large portions of their
o¤shore investment into Malaysia and Thailand, despite markedly lower wages in other parts
of the region. A large part of both economies is, however, controlled by ethnic Chinese who
maintain extensive social networks. The author argues that these networks shape many
investment decisions.2 Within the present context, the trade diversion would take the
form of unrealized o¤shoring projects in countries such as Bangladesh or Sri Lanka, i.e., in
destinations with very low wages but insu¢ cient links to Chinese networks.
The following section reviews the existing empirical research on the role of immigrant
links in international trade. Section 1.3 presents the empirical model and Section 1.4 dis-
cusses the data employed. The following sections cover econometric issues, results and
sensitivity analysis. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Evidence on trade and immigrant links
There exists a number of country-specic studies that estimate the relationship between
trade and immigrant links. For example, Gould (1993) analyzes migration inows in the
1Heerander and Saavedra (2006) cite Pengs (1998) survey on the characteristics of trade intermediaries
located in the U.S. According to this survey, 40 percent of U.S. intermediarieso¢ cers or managers are
foreign-born.
2Rauch and Trindade (2002) nd that for trade between Southeast Asian countries with high population
shares of ethnic Chinese, the smallest average portion of trade in di¤erentiated products attributable to
ethnic Chinese networks reaches nearly 60%.
4U.S. using panel data from 1970 to 1986 and predicts a 10-percent increase in immigrant
stock to increase U.S. exports by 4.7 percent and U.S. imports by 8.3 percent. An exercise
using Canadian data has been produced by Head and Ries (1998). The authors employ two
di¤erent measures of immigrant links, namely the cumulative sum of immigrant inows after
1970 and the imputed immigrant populations using census data, and report a 10-percent
increase in the immigrant stock to raise Canadian bilateral exports by 1.0-1.3 percent and
imports by 3.1-3.9 percent.3 Other more recent country studies include e.g., Girma and Yu
(2002) for the U.K, White (2007a) for Denmark, or Blanes (2005) for Spain. These works
will form a useful benchmark for the trade creation estimates discussed in Section 1.5.
A number of studies focus on characteristics of immigrantscountry of origin inuencing
immigrant-driven trade. The Canadian study by Head and Ries (1998) nds that trade
contribution of more recent immigrant cohorts from East Asian and Latin American coun-
tries tends to exceed that of traditional migrant communities from within the European
continent.4 The U.S. study by White (2007b) divides source countries into four income
groups and estimates the immigrant-link e¤ect for each distinct group. His results indicate
that immigrant networks from low income economies exert stronger inuence on trade than
their higher income counterparts. On the contrary, White (2007a) nds the opposite result
for the Danish data. Of course, these contrasting results might be driven by a number of
distinct channels that would ultimately correlate with the income level of a source country.
Besides di¤erent immigration histories emphasized by Head and Ries (1998), trade activi-
ties of immigrant networks could select into a relatively small number of sectors within the
source economy, so that their di¤erential contribution to trade would partially reect the
source countriessectoral dynamics. In that case, the less developed economies with larger
share of traditional sectors (such as production of cultural goods, see Tadesse and White,
2008) might observe correspondingly larger shares of immigrant-driven trade. Even without
the selective focus on a subset of industries, however, some networks might have limited
3The link between immigration and Canadian trade has also been studied by Helliwell (1997) and Wagner
et al. (2003).
4Recent shifts in the structure of immigrants countriesof origin for OECD member states have been
documented in OECD (2004).
5capacity to exploit all available trade opportunities given the time, skill or logistic con-
straints, which would again translate into their lower relative contribution to trade. Despite
the current inability to disentangle the individual mechanisms at work, Whites estimates
provide at least some idea on the actual magnitude of these e¤ects.
Moving towards potential trade-diverting role of immigrant networks, the research by
Herander and Saavedra (2005) is the only one to consider immigrant-driven trade spillovers.
Herander and Saavedra (2005), however, explore the spatial dimension of immigrant net-
works. Focusing on trade-creation e¤ects of immigrant networks operating within and be-
tween the U.S. states,5 the results show a consistently stronger impact on U.S. state export
volumes to a source country for local as compared to out-of-state populations. In particular,
their results qualitatively conform to previous estimates in that a 10-percent increase in the
local state immigration should on average increase the states exports by 1.6 percent. The
estimated impact of the out-of-state population, i.e. of the immigrant network geographic
spillovers, then raises the statesexport volumes by 0.7 percent only.
The present study aims to estimate a rather di¤erent dimension of network spillovers.
While Herander and Saavedra (2005) deal with trade facilitating spillovers generated by
immigrant networks of the same nationality located in di¤erent U.S. states, I instead focus
on the relevance of potential trade-diverting spillovers by immigrant networks from di¤er-
ent countries of origin within a given host economy. The following section presents the
estimation framework.
1.3 Empirical model
For the empirical evaluation of the trade creation and diversion hypotheses I use a simple
gravity framework that explicitly allows for matching in trade. The gravity relationship
proportionally linking trade ows to the output of trading economies can be derived from
a wide range of international trade models.6 The present section, however, shows that
5Another study focusing on trade-immigration link at the U.S. state level is Dunlevy (2006).
6Examples include Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1990), Deardorf (1998) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985).
6the gravity relationship might be consistent even with a very simple world economy with
matching and no di¤erences in productivity, endowments or preferences across countries.
Assume the world population N is distributed across J + I countries, where J are
labelled host and I source economies that di¤er in size and structure of their population.
Each agent regardless of location and status has linear preferences and is endowed with x
units of indivisible input normalized to zero, which can be used either for local production,
or as an input into joint venture with a foreign partner. While local production technology
transforms the normalized input into 1 unit of output, each of the participating parties
within joint venture has to invest their whole endowment to produce 2a, where a > 1 is a
measure of match quality.7
The total Nj population in each host economy j consists of
P
imij immigrants from
source countries i and Nj  
P
imij native agents, where mij equals a given immigrant
population from i residing in j: Source economies i consist of native agents only. Native
agents in i and j have to search in case they opt for foreign investment. During their random
search for joint venture, native agents in j might meet foreign agents with a probability pj .
Immigrants in j coming from source countries i are identical to native agents, but they
know identity of agents from source country i without having to search. Note that given
the absence of search costs and the uniform match quality a, immigrants never choose to
produce locally or to form a joint venture with agents from other than their source country
i. Instead, they contact native agents in source economy i and set up joint venture. Native
agents in i always accept, because a > 1 and the agents do not have to incur search costs.
The remaining populations in each country anticipate the choices of immigrants and
of contacted native agents in source economies and select local production if and only if
net expected prots exceed gains from a joint venture and/or uncontacted native agents in
source i would not accept the potential o¤er. The participation constraints of native agents
7The present model assumes that a > 1 is a result of the combination of host country and source countrys
specic knowledge. Agents within one country or agents from two di¤erent host countries cannot form a
joint venture.
7in host country j are:8
produce locally i¤ 1 > (1  pj) + pja
search for joint venture i¤ 1  (1  pj) + pja and 1  (1  pi) + pia;
where pj corresponds to
pj =
Pi hNi  Pjmiji
NI
min

1;
NI
NJ

;
and pi equals
pi =
Pj hNj  Pimiji
NJ
min

1;
NJ
NI

:
The participation constraints of uncontacted native agents in i are the same except that
pi replaces pj . Figure 1.1 outlines an example with world economy consisting of host country
1 and source country 2. The picture shows that immigrantsm21 coming from source country
2 and residing in host country 1 match with native agents in 2 and set up joint ventures.
The remaining native population N1  m21 in country 1 and N2  m21 in country 2 decide
to either produce locally or to search for a foreign partner. Figure 1.1 represents a situation
in which all agents try to form joint venture. Nonetheless, only a fraction in each of the two
economies succeeds in nding a foreign partner, the rest producing locally.
I take an approximation and assume the shares of overall immigrant populations in
host countries and the size of immigrant communities with respect to their source country
populations are su¢ ciently small, i.e., hj =
Pimij
Nj
! 0, 8j and di =
Pj mij
Ni
! 0, 8i; j.9
Then pj ! 1, pi ! 1 and country js share in the aggregate output of all host countries
equals
GDPj
GDPJ
=
Nj [(1  hj) + ahj + a (1  hj) pj ]Pj Nj [(1  hj) + ahj + a (1  hj) pj ] = NjPj Nj ; (1.1)
8 I assume both investors in joint venture play Nash bargaining solution and split the resulting joint
surplus 2a equally.
9The average immigrant share in host countries
Pimij
Nj
in the sample is 0.026 and the average size of
immigrants relative to source country populations
Pj mij
Ni
equals 0.033.
8Figure 1.1: Matching in world economy with one host and one source country.
where the terms in the brackets correspond to the contributions of local production, immi-
grant joint ventures, and joint ventures of native agents.
Similarly, a source country is share in output of all source countries corresponds to
GDPi
GDPI
=
Ni [(1  di) + adi + a (1  di) pi]PiNi [(1  di) + adi + a (1  di) pi] = NiPiNi ; (1.2)
For NJ  NI and using (1.1), trade volume TNij generated by host j nativesjoint ventures
equals1011
TNij = aNJ
GDPiGDPj
GDPIGDPJ
 
1 
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
! 
1 
PI
i=1mij
Nj
!
(1.3)
and trade volume T Iij generated by the immigrants from i residing in j is
T Iij = aNJ
mij
Nj
GDPj
GDPJ
; (1.4)
10The case NJ > NI does not change the line of argument.
11 It might happen that the middle term in brackets and hence predicted trade can turn negative. The
situation corresponds to a hypothetical country with its overseas diaspora larger than the countrys do-
mestic population. As all observations in the present sample are positive, I assume such a situation does
not occur.
9where use was made of (1.1). Summing the last two expressions, one obtains the relationship
for bilateral trade:
Tij = T
N
ij + T
I
ij = (1.5)
= aNJ
GDPiGDPj
GDPIGDPJ
" 
1 
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
! 
1 
PI
i=1mij
Nj
!
+
mij
Nj
GDPi
GDPI
#
: (1.6)
Premultiplying by

1 PJj=1mij=Ni1 PIi=1mij=Nj ; taking logarithms and approx-
imating ln(1 + x) s x for x small, one obtains
lnTij = ln

aNJ
GDPiGDPj
GDPIGDPJ

 
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
 
PI
i=1mij
Nj
+ ij
mij
Nj
GDPi
GDPI
; (1.7)
where
ij =
 
1 
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
! 1 
1 
PI
i=1mij
Nj
! 1
Finally, for the estimation purposes, I use the general version of (1.7):
lnTij = b0 + b1 lnGDPiGDPj + b2
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
+ b3
PI
i=1mij
Nj
+ b4
mij
Nj
GDPi
GDPI
+ b5
 mij
Nj
GDPi
GDPI
!2
+az + j + "ij ; (1.8)
where lnTij corresponds to the natural logartihm of either exports or imports owing
between countries i and j.
The coe¢ cients b2 and b3 indicate the indirect impact on native-driven bilateral trade
between i and j that has been caused by immigrants choice to trade with their source
countries (see Equation 1.3), and are expected to be equal to minus one. The coe¢ cient b2
captures the e¤ect on bilateral trade of source country diasporas located in other countries.
The larger is the overall diaspora relative to the population of country of origin, the lower
are the chances of hosts native agents to nd a match in concerned source country. Since b2
relates to the population of a source country Ni and approximates the potentially negative
impact on native-driven bilateral trade, in the following I call the relative size of diasporaPJ
j=1mij
Ni
the source country trade diversion term.
10
The coe¢ cient b3 captures the role of the overall share of immigrants in host js pop-
ulation. Using the logic of the present empirical model, the more immigrants in a given
host country match with agents in their countries of origin, the lower will be the probability
of hosts native agents to trade with a given trade partner. b3 connects to the population
of a host country Nj and similarly to the coe¢ cient b2 estimates the negative impact on
native-driven bilateral trade. For these reasons I label the overall immigrant share in host
js population
PI
i=1mij
Nj
the host country trade diversion term.
Being an empirical counterpart of ij in Equation 1.7, the coe¢ cient b4 reects the
direct trade contribution by immigrants from i located in j (see also Equation 1.4), and
is expected to be positive.12 Note that the corresponding term di¤ers from the commonly
used natural logarithm of immigrant stock13 as well as other commonly employed measures
of immigrant links and has the source country GDPi in its denominator. While the natural
logarithm formulation remains intuitively appealing and easy to interpret, it su¤ers from
the lack of theoretical justication and zero predicted trade in the absence of immigrant
networks. The immigrant terms derived within the present framework rely on an explicit
model and emphasize relative rather than absolute measures of immigrant networks. As
the coe¢ cient b4 reects direct positive immigrant e¤ects on trade, the corresponding term
will be referred to as the trade creation term.
The emphasis on the relative number of immigrants derives from the models assump-
tions of di¤erent populations across host and source countries, and the possibility to form
joint venture with one agent only. Other things equal, the higher the fraction of host js
population represented by immigrants from i, the more joint ventures will be formed with
agents in immigrantssource country i. Similarly, the larger is the economy of immigrants
country of origin, the higher will be agent js probability of forming a joint venture with
an agent from i, and the smaller will be immigrantsrelative contribution to bilateral trade
12 I assume the parameter ij in Equation 1.7 to be constant across all pairs ij, i.e., ij = . This certainly
leads to a measurement error in the right-hand-side variable and a subsequent coe¢ cient bias towards
zero. On the other hand, the estimates explicitly accounting for

1 PJj=1mij=Ni1 PIi=1mij=Nj
practically do not di¤er from the simplifed output with  replacing ij . The estimation results are available
upon request.
13The natural logarithms have been used by e.g., Head and Ries (1998), Girma and Yu (2002) and
Heerander and Saavedra (2006).
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between i and j. The relationship between the absolute measures of immigrant links (such
as the natural logarithm of immigrant stock), and the relative measure derived within the
present framework will be discussed in Section 1.5.
Larger immigrant communities might tend to trade with each other instead of trading
with their country of origin. To accomodate possible trade substitution, I add a quadratic
approximation of the trade creation term with a negative expected sign of the coe¢ cient
b5.14 It should be remembered that in order to obtain the net e¤ect of immigrants on
bilateral trade between i and j, one should take into account both the trade-creation and
trade-divertion e¤ects of immigrant links:
z is k  1 vector of additional explanatory variables that vary either at the level of
host j, source i, or at the level of country pairs ij. The former two groups include export
shares in the GDP as a proxy for openess and institutional quality measures. The country-
pair ij variables consist of the natural logarithm of distance, the product of GDPs per
capita (expressed in natural logarithms) and dummies for shared colonial past and common
language.
Colonial past and common language are often used as proxies for informal trade barriers.
As for the colonial dummy, entrepreneurs from former colonial power, e.g., traders or spe-
cialized information agencies, might have extended business links from colonial times and
thus possess valuable information and contacts. Furthermore, a former colonial power often
played a key role in the design of local institutions in source country. The resulting institu-
tional proximity would then translate into relatively lower demands on the understanding
of the local market environment. A common language dummy should capture lower search
costs for all agents using the same mother language and again facilitate matching process.
I divide the colony and language dummy variables by the GDP of a source country i, so
that the resulting variables are non-increasing in the source economys size. The expected
signs of coe¢ cient estimates for both variables are positive, resulting in larger predicted
trade impact of common language and/or colonial past for smaller source economies. In-
14While the immigrant ties introduced by the present matching model shift the geographical pattern of
trade, they should not inuence the total volume of trade between a given host country and its trading
partners. If one is willing to accept the assumption of a more e¢ cient matching technology by immigrant
joint ventures, the total trade e¤ect would be positive.
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tuitively, had all the trading partners shared colonial past (or language), the relative trade
enhancing role of both would be zero. As the trading partner gets smaller in size, however,
their relevance should tend to increase as a smaller open economy tends to be relatively
more sensitive to trade barriers.
The error term has two components. "ij is a random term specic to individual country
pairs ij and independent of other errors. j correponds to an error term that is correlated
within host country j. If common group errors j have not been controlled for, the resulting
standard error estimates might su¤er from a notable downward bias (Moulton, 1986). I allow
for a more general covariance structure and heteroscedasticity of j as proposed by Liang
and Zeger (1986). As an alternative form of adjustment for common-group errors, I employ
the 2-step estimation approach by Donald and Lang (2007) that generates more reliable
estimates in case the number of groups is small.
The advantage of the latter procedure is its robustness in case the number of groups
is small, so that researchers do not have to rely on the asymptotics along the number of
groups necessary for the cluster command.
The two-step procedure starts with the OLS regression of the natural logarithm of bi-
lateral exports/imports on variables di¤ering across country pairs ij, country j- and i-xed
e¤ects:
1st stage: lnTij = b0 lnGDPiGDPj + x0ijb + a0
mij
Nj
GDPi
GDPI
+ d 0ij + "ij ;
where the term following coe¢ cient a0 is the newly added share in host population of a
given immigrant stock relative to the country of origin GDPi.
In the second stage, I run feasible GLS with the relevant xed e¤ect coe¢ cient estimates
from the rst stage as dependent variables and country i- (or j-) level variables on the right-
hand side of the regression:
2nd stage: d^j = c(J) + x0jz + a1
PI
i=1mij
Nj
+ uj ; var^(uj) = ^
2I (J ) + d^j (1.9)
and d^i = c(I) + x0iw + a2
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
+ ui; var^(ui) = ^
2I (I ) + d^i ; (1.10)
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where Equation 1.9 estimates the coe¢ cient on the host trade diversion term, Equation
1.10 estimates the coe¢ cient on the source trade diversion term, and var^(ufj;ig) stands for
the variance of the respective 2nd-stage error term ufj;ig. The vectors of country-specic
terms xi and xj include the natural logartihms of real GDP and GDP per capita, the
corresponding relative measure, share of exports in GDP, and the Heritage Foundation
measure of institutional quality.
PI
i=1mij
Nj
stands for the population share of the overall
immigrant stock (regardless of origin) within a given host country,
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
represents the
size of the overseas diaspora relative to the population in diasporas country of origin. The
GLS procedure uses xed e¤ect covariance estimates fd^j ;d^ig from the 1st stage for the
construction of weights.15
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Immigrants
The cross-country information on the numbers of foreign-born persons over 15 years of
age for 19 OECD member countries was retrieved from the OECD Statistics Portal on
Demography and Population.16 The main advantage of the present dataset rests in the
variation at both the source and host country levels, which permits the estimation of trade-
diversion e¤ects. This was not possible in empirical studies focusing exclusively on a single
host country.
The OECD data represents the rst attempt to create a coherent dataset covering several
host countries. The data have been drawn from population registers, residence or work
permits, surveys and censuses taking place usually every 5 or 10 years. Due to di¤erent
timing of censuses, the reference year varies between 1999 and 2002, depending on the
specic country. Some OECD countries had to be dropped due to large proportions of
15For more details see Donald and Lang (2007), p. 224-225.
16Other studies on trade and migration using the OECD migration data include working papers by Dol-
man(2007), and Felbemayr and Toubal (2008).
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foreign-born population with the unknown country of origin.17 For host countries that were
left in the sample the values of unknown foreign-born did not exceed 2%. These unknown
populations have been distributed using country-of-origin shares in the total number of
foreign born in a concerned host country. The new entities on territories of former Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia have not been included due to di¤erences in aggregation across host
countries.18
The gures for Germany were listed only by broad source regions instead of countries.
For the Netherlands, the data included only the number of all foreign born instead of those
over 15 years of age. I replaced the data for Germany with gures from the Federal Statistical
O¢ ce of Germany and, since the available data for both Germany and the Netherlands
covered total foreign-born population only, I adjusted them by the shares of immigrants
over 15 years of age in the total foreign-born population by source country as recorded for
comparatively open Belgium. As part of the sensitivity analysis in Section 1.6, I drop the
two host countries and run all regressions to check for the robustness of results.
1.4.2 Trade and remaining data
The data on bilateral exports and imports have been obtained from the Direction of Trade
Statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund. Trade volumes of especially smaller
developing countries can vary substantially from year to year. For that reason ve-year
averages of real trade volumes over 1999-2003 have been chosen instead of using the data for
a single year only. The ve-year averages reduce an additional problem with zero observed
exports and imports.19 Finally, since the focus of the present study is immigrant networks
17These include Australia (16.2% unknown), Czech Republic (28.2%), Mexico (41.9%), New Zealand
(16.1%), Poland (41.1%), Slovak Republic (9.3%), and Switzerland (14.7%). The borderline cases, Finland
(3.8%) and Denmark (6.7%) were left in the sample.
18Turkey, the last OECD member in the sample, is in many respects closer to a typical developing country
and its membership in the OECD owes more to strategic considerations rather than the level of economic
development. Nonetheless, despite being left out from the main regressions, the results with Turkey as a
host country remain both quantitatively and statistically similar to the main regression results listed in
Table 1.2. Results including Turkey can be provided upon request.
19While 23 out of the total 1,684 sample observations on exports from host countries (i.e. roughly 1.4
percent) reported zero trade in at least one year over the 1999-2003 period, none of them did so for the
whole ve year period. For imports to host countries the gures equalled 57 (i.e., 3.4 percent) and 18
respectively. The tentative random-e¤ect tobit estimates using the xttobit command in Stata produced
15
and the home links of overseas Chinese communities quite likely cover both China and Hong
Kong, the two entities are treated as a single country.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics, n=1,684.
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Exportsij 353.49 2,156.04 0.001 62,824.19
Importsij 324.23 1,780.94 0 48,734.65
Host GDPj 1,164,183 2,101,759 77,757.52 9,012,508
Source GDPi 46,081.42 128,490.4 575.76 1,027,513
Host GDP/capitaj 21,786.83 7,720.79 9,306.51 36,720.11
Source GDP/capitai 3,034.50 4,972.48 100,78 29,185.42
Immigrant stockij 12,365.68 65,698.51 0 8,359,180
Trade creationij 0.44 1.55 0 12.59
Host diversionj 0.02 0.02 0.002 0.07
Source diversioni 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.33
Distanceij 7,300.51 3,487.39 375 19,594
Export share hostj 0.42 0.22 0.11 0.98
Export share sourcei 0.19 0.14 0.03 0.76
Institutional quality hostj 73.19 6.39 58.53 81.01
Institutional quality sourcei 44.58 13.98 15.09 78.5
Shared colonial pastij/GDPi 0.01 0.02 0 0.15
Common languageij/GDPi 0.01 0.03 0 0.16
in millions of 1998 U.S. dollars
The remaining variables, common language and a measure of circle distance between
capital cities were retrieved from Jon Havemans web page20 and added manually if values
were missing. A dummy for common colonial past was constructed from histories of each
colonial power detailed in Wikipedia. The dummy equals one if the country in question
was either a colony or protectorate after 1945. As a measure of institutional quality I use
the ve-year averages for countries i and j of the restricted Index of Economic Freedom
produced by the Heritage Foundation. The Index of Economic Freedom over 1999-2003
coe¢ cient estimates that were qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to results in Table 1.2. These
can be provided upon request. The export gures are reported f.o.b., the import volumes are c.i.f.
20Jon Havemans web page can be found at http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/
HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Gravity.
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compiles evaluations of nine areas essential for functioning market environment. The re-
stricted version includes only those areas that most closely relate to institutional quality in
trade context corruption, non-tari¤ trade barriers, rule of law and regulatory burden 
and drops ination, scal burden, restrictions on banks, labor regulation and government
intervention. Finally, gures on population, GDP, GDP per capita and export shares in
hostsGDP were collected from the World Development Indicators published by the World
Bank. To avoid the potential endogeneity problem of the GDP variables, I use GDP and
GDP per capita gures from 1998 as proxies. The main sample consists of 19 host countries
and 90 source countries, generating an unbalanced panel of 1,684 observations. Table 1.1
presents the summary statistics for key variables.
1.5 Empirical results
The estimated coe¢ cients for the trade creation and diversion terms are reported in Table
1.2.21 The rst columns for both exports and imports display the estimates from the bench-
mark OLS regression with regional dummies for host and source countries and clustering
by host country. In the following columns I present the results of the Donald and Lang
(2007)s 2-step procedure, where the trade creation estimates have been obtained in the 1st
stage. Columns (2) and (5) contain the 2nd stage estimates of the source trade diversion
for exports and imports. Columns (3) and (6) report the estimated coe¢ cients of the host
country trade diversion term.
1.5.1 Trade creation
Regardless of specication and direction of trade, the estimated coe¢ cients on trade creation
are consistently positive, relatively stable, and signicantly di¤erent from zero at least
21For a complete list of all explanatory variables and estimation results see Table A1.2 in Appendix A1.
For Liang and Zeger (1986)s OLS estimation with clustering, Equation 1.8 has been supplied with regional
dummies to control for possible correlation of explanatory variables with unobserved region characteristics.
The ve regional dummies for host countries correspond to North America, East Asia, Northern Europe,
Central Europe, and Southern Europe, the UK and Ireland representing the benchmark economies. For
source countries the regions are Northern Africa and Arab states, Subsaharan Africa, South Asia and
South-East Asia, with Latin American countries being the baseline economies.
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Table 1.2: Main regression results, dependent variables real exports and imports 1999-2003.
Real exports 1999-2003
(1) OLS regional (2) 2-step estimates (3) 2-step estimates
dummies i and j for source i for host j
Trade creationij 0.085 0.056 0.056
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
Trade creationij2 -0.184 -0.001 -0.001
(0.056) (0.001) (0.001)
Source diversioni -0.117 -2.486 -
(0.476) (0.939)
Host diversionj -9.099 - -6.911
(6.036) (4.105)
R2 0.852 0.670 0.595
N 1,577 1,684 1,684
Real imports 1999-2003
(4) OLS regional (5) 2-step estimates (6) 2-step estimates
dummies i and j for source i for host j
Trade creationij 0.073 0.044 0.044
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Trade creationij2 -0.223 -0.001 -0.001
(0.06) (0.001) (0.001)
Source diversioni -1.475 -1.654 -
(0.5) (0.965)
Host diversionj -10.408 - -4.929
(3.999) (11.235)
R2 0.856 0.496 0.600
N 1,577 1,684 1,684
Notes: The OLS with regional dummies account for clustering by host countries.
***,**,* - Signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
at the 5 percent signicance level. The marginal trade creation impact of a 10-percent
increase in immigrant stock mij depends on the level of mij , population of host j, and
the output GDPi of source country i (see Equation 1.8). This dependance di¤ers from
the studies using natural logarithm of immigrant stock, where the marginal impact is fully
described by the estimated regression coe¢ cient. Table 1.3 provides examples of the implied
export and import creation resulting from a 10 percent boost of immigrant stock for country
pairs ij that have di¤erent levels of GDPi, but are otherwise comparable in terms of both
mij and Nj . The estimates suggest that for source countries with smaller GDPi levels, a
given number of immigrants connects to a relatively larger part of source economy. Due
to the gravity relationship linking output with trade, these connections then translate into
relatively higher shares in trade between host j and source i.
The implied marginal trade creation e¤ects lie within the interval h0; 1i in more than
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91,5 percent of country pairs in the sample and generally fall short of marginal e¤ects
reported by studies using the natural logarithm of immigrant stock.22 Apart from the
measurement error of the trade creation term discussed in Section 1.3, lower marginal e¤ects
can be partly explained by the cross-sectional nature of the sample and low immigrant levels
mij in a number of host countries. Focusing on the trade e¤ect of a 10-percent increase
in immigrant stock mij and holding other things constant, country pairs ij with smaller
immigrant populations generate lower marginal trade e¤ects as compared to observations
with more numerous immigrant stocks. The smaller marginal impacts (as compared to
earlier empirical studies) nonetheless apply to all host economies and pairs ij, regardless of
immigrantspopulation size mij .
Table 1.3: Examples of trade creation in response to a 10 percent boost in immigrant stock
for di¤erent host and source countries.
GDP is Immigrant Exports Imports
Host j Source i % share population creation creation
in world GDP mij in % in %
Canada Bangladesh 0.14 19,515 0.24 0.19
Tanzania 0.03 19,525 1.19 0.93
France China 3.68 32,913 0.01 0.01
Cameroon 0.03 33,125 0.95 0.75
Netherlands Pakistan 0.24 10,052 0.15 0.11
Ghana 0.16 10,311 2.2 1.73
UK South Africa 0.44 124,658 0.27 0.21
Kenya 0.044 125,491 2.70 2.12
USA Panama 0.039 132,975 0.68 0.53
Cambodia 0.11 133,240 2.46 1.93
22For example, a static version of the model by Girma and Yu (2002) produces a 1.6 percent increase in
UK exports and a 1 percent rise in UK imports from non-Commonwealth countries. Head and Ries (1998)
nd a 1-1.3 percent boost for Canadian bilateral exports and 3.1-3.9 percent for imports. The study on
U.S. exports by Herander and Saavedra (2005) reports 1.6 percent.
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Another and potentially more important explanation relates to the role of source country
GDPi. Immigrants from source countries with lower levels of GDPi trade relatively more
than their counterparts from larger source economies. This is intuitive if trade is propor-
tional to GDPs of trading parties (as in model from Section 1.3) and immigrantstrading
technology has constant returns to scale, since then a given number of better-informed
immigrants will generate a lower fraction of the overall trade volume.
The lower magnitude of the trade-creation e¤ects can be also explained by the discrep-
ancy between the estimated and theoretical coe¢ cient values. The model from Section 1.3
predicts the trade creation coe¢ cient b4 to exceed one for immigrant shares su¢ ciently
small. This could change once some of the assumptions get relaxed. While immigrants are
more likely to understand the source is environment and business practices as compared
to native agents from host j, they could lack the knowledge necessary for exports of more
sophisticated and value added products. For example, Turkish traders in Germany might
specialize in trading of used cars or ethnic goods instead of power engines. Relatively less
productive matching (as compared to matches initiated by host js natives) might be rational
especially if immigrantsoutside options in host j are not su¢ ciently protable. The out-
side options of immigrants might be thought of as a function of pro¢ ciency in host-country
language, legal status, and/or experience with hosts labor market. Given this assumption,
they are likely to be lower than the opportunities of native agents.23 Sectors that have
some bearing to immigrants source country thus could provide one of few opportunities
to employ immigrantshuman capital gainfully, even though the ultimate contribution to
trade might be relatively lower than that of native agents.
Finally, immigrant networks could operate across a larger number of countries. In such
a case, the matching mechanism in model from Section 1.3 might be too restrictive and low
trade creation estimates would be capturing only a fraction of the total e¤ect.
23The empirical study on Izraeli labor market by Friedberg (2000) found that immigrants education
obtained abroad is signicantly less rewarded than education received locally. Similarly, Chiswick and
Miller (1995) focus on the impact of language pro¢ ciency on immigrantsearnings in Australia and three
other countries (the USA, Canada, and Israel), and show that higher uency in hosts language signicantly
increases immigrantsearnings.
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Trade creation term vs. natural logarithm of immigrant stock
In this section I focus on the relative performance of the trade creation term and the
commonly employed level measures such as the natural logarithm of immigrant stock. Figure
Figure 1.2: Immigrant stock, its natural logarithm, and trade creation term.
0
5
10
15
Trade
creation term,
Ln(Imm stock)
0 200000 400000 600000 800000 1000000
Immigrant stock from i in j
Ln(Immigrant stock) Trade creation term
1.2 illustrates the sample relationship between the absolute immigrant stock mij , its natural
logarithm ln(mij), and the trade creation variable derived in Section 1.3.
The gure indicates that the trade creation term is only weakly related to the natural
logarithm of immigrant stock.24 Table 1.4 reports the estimates from regressions with host
j and source i xed e¤ects and clustering by host country. The regressions employ both
specications of the immigrant variable, rst separately and then simultaneously.
The coe¢ cient estimates from the specication with natural logarithm in columns (2)
and (5) resemble results from the previous studies. For the present dataset, a 10 percent
increase in the immigrant stock leads on average to a 1.06 percent boost of exports from, and
a 1.13 percent increase in imports to the host country. The natural logarithm specication
24The correlation coe¢ cient between the trade creation term and the natural logarithm of immigrant stock
equals 0.126
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of the immigrant variable, however, su¤ers from the ignorance of trade partners economic
size and immigrantsshare in host js population.
Figure 1.3 summarizes the di¤erences between the two specications in predicted bi-
lateral export increases following the 10-percent rise of immigrant population mij in host
j. The horizontal line indicates the marginal e¤ect obtained from the natural logarithm
specication in Column 2 - i.e., the value of the coe¢ cient on Ln(Imm stock)ij , multiplied
by 10. The implied e¤ect from the natural logarithm specication thus remains the same
Table 1.4: Trade creation term vs natural logarithm of immigrant stock, xed e¤ect esti-
mates.
Real exports 1999-2003 Real imports 1999-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade creationij 0.056 - 0.02 0.044 - 0.025
(0.017) (0.01) (0.018) (0.013)
Trade creation2ij -0.001 - -0.035 -0.001 - -0.049
(0.001) (0.038) (0.001) (0.047)
Ln(Imm stock)ij - 0.106 0.092 - 0.113 0.095
(0.02) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
R2 0.910 0.911 0.912 0.906 0.906 0.908
N 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684
Note: All estimates account for clustering by host countries. Standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* - Signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
regardless of the actual size of the immigrant community mij . In case of the calculated mar-
ginal impacts obtained from the specication derived in Section 1.3 using results listed in
Column (1) in Table 1.4, the trade increases center mostly on larger immigrant populations,
leaving smaller communities mij without any notable e¤ect on trade.
Finally, Columns (3) and (6) in Table 1.4 report the results from the estimation including
simultaneously trade creation term and the natural logarithm of immigrant stock.25 One
can observe that despite a drop in the levels of the trade creation term, the combination
of relative and absolute measures preserves the statistical signicance of both. The levels
25The 2nd stage estimates of host and source trade diversion coe¢ cients did not change substantially and
can be provided to interested reader.
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Figure 1.3: Marginal trade creation e¤ects of a 10-percent increase in mij ; matching model
predictions, real exports 1999-2003.
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and joint signicance of the relative and absolute terms suggest that despite the signicance
of the trade creation term, and its account for trade partners output GDPi and relative
size of immigrant population mijNj , the model from Section 1.3 captures only part of the
trade-immigration story. The next subsection focuses on the trade diversion estimates.
1.5.2 Trade diversion
Regardless of specication and direction of trade, the host and source trade diversion terms
in 1.2 have expected signs. Focusing on the estimates obtained through Donald and Lang
(2007)s 2-step procedure, the source trade diversion terms di¤er from zero at least at 10-
percent probability level, and all trade diversion coe¢ cients are negative and not statistically
di¤erent from minus one as predicted by the model from Section 1.3. A one-percentage-
point increase in the size of the total immigrant community
PJ
j=1mij relative to the source
country is population would result in a decrease in its total exports by roughly 2.5 percent
and its total imports by 1.7 percent on average. The host diversion estimate is statistically
23
not di¤erent from zero.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 present the net overall e¤ect on trade of host and source countries,
using the coe¢ cient estimates from the 2-step procedure by Donald and Lang (2007) that
included the natural logarithm of immigrant stock and trade creation and diversion measures
derived in Section 1.3.26 Each gure provides an answer to one of two simple questions.
1) Do immigrant communities located in a given host j facilitate aggregate trade between
host j and immigrantscountries of origin? 2) Do source countries with larger shares of
population located in advanced OECD economies on aggregate benet from immigrant-
driven trade links?
To answer the rst question, I consider the implied marginal impact on the sum of exports
and imports of a balanced 10-percent increase across total immigrant population
PI
i=1mij
for a given host j, holding total population constant. For the second question, I employ
the same proportional increase of a given source is natives located in OECD countriesPJ
j=1mij , again xing source is population Ni. Figure 1.4 presents the predicted impact
on the sum of exports and imports for 19 OECD host countries in the sample. Present
results are consistent with the positive role of immigrant links found by previous studies,
with Austria being the only OECD country with negative predicted impact of immigrants
on trade. The positive role of immigrant links related to information provision, informal
contract enforcement and preferences for source-country products thus seems to dominate
the potential losses due to associated shifts in trade of host countries.
A similar conclusion holds for source countries and their populations located in OECD
host countries. 71 out of 90 source economies show positive marginal impact of immigrant
links on the economiestotal trade with OECD hosts. The marginal impact on trade on
average declines with rising shares of source is population located in OECD host countries.
Since the trade creation term does not change substantially with rising shares of source
is total overseas population, the trade diversion channel gradually gains in importance.
The net e¤ect of immigrants on trade might even turn negative in case the productivity of
26 I did not include host trade diversion term in the computations of net trade e¤ects, given that it was not
statistically di¤erent from zero. Net trade e¤ects on exports and imports for individual host and source
countries can be found in Table A1.1 in Appendix A1.
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Figure 1.4: Host js aggregate trade with source countries and 10% increase in total immi-
grant stock.
AUT
BEL
CAN
DNK
FIN
FRA
GER
GRE
IRL
JAP
KOR
NED
NOR
PTG
ESP
UK USA
0
.5
1
1.
5
N
et
 tr
ad
e 
im
pa
ct
 (i
n%
)
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Total immigrant share in host j
Figure 1.5: Source is aggregate trade with OECD countries and 10% increase in total
immigrant stock.
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matches between immigrants and natives from source i falls short of productive matches
forgone by host js native agents. The next section focuses on the robustness of the estimated
results.
1.6 Sensitivity analysis
1.6.1 Relative size of source markets, large immigrant stocks and adjustments in migration
data
The model and econometric specication in Section 1.3 assume the trade creation coe¢ cient
to be identical across all observations, and the only country-pair ij variation in estimated
trade creation e¤ects to be driven by di¤erences across immigrant stocks mij , host popu-
lations Nj , and/or source countriesGDPi. With larger immigrant share
mij
Nj
relatively to
source-country GDPi, immigrant networks might face decreasing number of protable trad-
ing opportunities or tougher competition between individual network participants, which
translate into lower prot margins. The trade creation coe¢ cient would then likely vary
across di¤erent country groups.
To evaluate this hypothesis, I construct two additional variables Trade creation largeij
and Ln(Imm stock largeij), which are equal to the values of Trade creationij and Ln(Imm
stock ij) in case Trade creationij > 1, and zero otherwise. These variables should capture
trade impact of immigration for country pairs with large immigrant communities mij (in
terms of host js population) relatively to market size in country of origin i.27 I then run
the xed e¤ects regression allowing for clustering by host country and compare the obtained
estimates with previous results. Table 1.5 presents the regression output.
The estimates show that given the use of the natural logarithm of immigrant stock,
immigrantscontribution to trade between countries with relatively large immigrant com-
munities in host j combined with small source-country i markets is no di¤erent from others.
The situation becomes radically di¤erent once trade creation measure from Section 1.3 is
27The 142 out of 1,684 observations having trade-creation values above one consist mostly of trade partners
with former colonial relationship (38 out of 53 colonial pairs in the sample), or poorer/small economies
with disproportionately large overseas diasporas.
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Table 1.5: Estimates distinguishing source countries with relatively large immigrant com-
munities, i.e. Trade creationij > 1.
Real exports 1999-2003 Real imports 1999-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trade creationij 0.607 - 0.409 0.522 - 0.391
(0.085) (0.133) (0.101) (0.141)
Trade creation largeij -0.545 - -0.427 -0.473 - -0.435
(0.08) (0.129) (0.09) (0.136)
Ln(Imm stock)ij - 0.128 0.096 - 0.117 0.089
(0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.03)
Ln(Imm stock large)ij - 0.002 0.028 - 0.008 0.04
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
R2 0.911 0.913 0.914 0.900 0.903 0.904
N 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684 1,684
Note: All estimates account for clustering by host countries. Standard errors in parentheses.
***,**,* - Signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
employed. The coe¢ cient estimates suggest that previous results from Table 1.2 in fact
averaged the e¤ects across country pairs with rather heterogeneous immigrant-trade links.
The estimates maintain relatively high levels even after the simultaneous inclusion of both
proxies for immigrant networks. A relatively small market size in country of origin i thus
might prevent the full realization of benets from immigrant-driven trade due to, e.g., more
intensive competition among traders and resulting lower markups. This is not to say that
concerned country pairs do not benet from immigrants at all. The signs and statistical
signicance of the natural logarithm of immigrant stock in fact indicate that the absolute
size of immigrant community matters even more for source countries with relatively small
markets.28 This result is consistent with the study by White (2007b), given that these
source countries have relatively lower GDP per capita levels with respect to the rest of the
sample.
Apart from the heterogeneity across the trade creation dimension, the estimated out-
28Figure A1.1 and Figure A1.2 in Appendix A1 show the net trade e¤ects for a balanced 10-percent
rise of immigrant stock, using the coe¢ cient estimates from Columns (3) and (6) in Table 1.5 and the
corresponding 2-stage estimates. Figure A1.3 presents trade creation predictions for a 10-percent increase
in mij generated by the matching model from Section 1.3.
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comes might be possibly driven by a handful of source countries with large immigrant
populations. To account for this possibility, for each host j I drop ve source countries (out
of 90 non-OECD states) with the highest share in the overall immigrant stock. The levels
and the statistical signicance of the output, however, remain the same and can be provided
upon request.
The discussion of the data on foreign-born persons in Section 1.4.1 mentioned the adjust-
ments made to allow the inclusion of two key host countries, Germany and the Netherlands,
into the sample. I run the whole estimation again and drop both host countries. Again, the
results do not change substantially and the coe¢ cients of interest remain highly signicant.
1.6.2 Endogeneity of immigrant variables
The potential endogeneity of trade creation and diversion terms presents a might cast some
doubt on the presented results. Over time, trade partners could learn about the living con-
ditions in the other country and might pass the information further to potential migrants.
Growing bilateral trade might likewise provide employment opportunities within the immi-
grant communities engaged in trading and thus reduce the ex ante uncertainty of agents
considering migration.
While similar reasoning seems to be in line with the ndings of the literature on inter-
national migration,29 previous studies on immigrant networks have avoided the endogeneity
issue. Indeed, nding a suitable instrument for the trade creation variable proves to be a
daunting task. An exception is Javorcik et al. (2006)s study of migrant networkslinks and
foreign direct investment. The authors use the natural logarithm of population density and
the share of passport costs in real GDP per capita in the source country from McKenzie
(2005), both identied as signicant push factors for migration. For the present purposes,
however, the correlations between the stock of immigrants, population density in the source
country and passport costs seem to be negligible and in the former case even with the
opposite sign.
29Focusing on the key pull and push factors shaping international migration decisions, Mayda (2005) nds
a statistically signicant positive e¤ect of bilateral trade.
28
The correlations of the two IVs and immigrant levels when all expressed in natural
logarithms are higher (0.14 and -0.21, respectively). Nonetheless, in the 2SLS regressions on
exports and imports with the logartihms of both IVs and the natural logartihm of immigrant
stock as the instrumented variable, the Shea partial R-squared failed to pass 0.01 for any
combination of the instruments and joint F-tests in the rst stage did not prove to be
signicant. The weakness of the available instruments thus precludes the quantication of
the degree of endogeneity, at least in terms of the trade creation term.
Moving to the trade diversion terms, any signicant endogeneity problem seems to be
of minor relevance. The trade diversion variables relate the total immigrant shares in
host and source population to bilateral trade. If bilateral trade between countries i and
j promotes international migration between the two yet not between the host or source
country and other economies, its contribution to the total immigration shares would be
most likely negligible.30 Moreover, the mutual relationship between the immigration shares
and bilateral trade should be positive, whereas the trade diversion terms establish a negative
link. Hence, if anything, the endogeneity would underestimate the impact of trade diversion
by immigrant networks.
1.7 Concluding remarks
The study complements research on the links between immigrant networks and international
trade. The trade creation measure derived within the matching framework points to the
importance of the relative size of a given source country economy and immigrant network.
I estimate the di¤erential impact of immigrant links based on the GDP of their respective
country of origin and nd that the immigrant communities from relatively larger economies
facilitate trade less than implied by existing studies.
While previous work focused largely on trade creation by immigrant networks, I also
derive trade diversion measures capturing negative spillovers to host and source countries
total exports. While immigrant networks can mitigate some informal barriers to trade (e.g.,
the lack of information on foreign markets or ine¤ective contract enforcement institutions),
30The shares in the host population for the largest source country i do not exceed 2.1 percent.
29
the same networksadvantages coupled with the pervasive presence of informal trade barriers
might lead to shifts in trade patterns previously known e.g., in the context of customs
unions. By channeling trade to the immigrantscountry of origin, potentially more protable
matches in other countries become lost. Using a dataset of 19 OECD countries, I nd some
empirical support for this hypothesis.
Apart from being statistically signicant, the results are robust to the inclusion of com-
monly used level measures of immigrant stock. Nonetheless, more work needs to be done in
the search for valid instruments that could better capture potential endogeneity concerns
relating to the immigrant network variables. Future extensions that allow for heterogeneity
in matching as well as country productivity could furthermore permit more precise estimates
of both trade creation and diversion terms.
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Table A.1: Net trade effect of a 10-percent increase of total immigrant stock. 
OECD host Source 
countries 
Net trade 
effect (in %) countries 
Net trade 
effect (in %) 
Austria Guinea 
Belgium Haiti 
Canada Honduras 
Denmark Indonesia 
Finland Iran 
France Israel 
Germany Jamaica 
Greece Jordan 
Ireland Kenya 
Italy Kuwait 
Japan Lao P.Dem.R 
Korea Lebanon 
Netherlands Madagascar 
Norway Malawi 
Portugal Malaysia 
Spain Mali 
Sweden Malta 
UK Mauritania 
USA 
-0,12 
0,74 
0,97 
0,48 
0,71 
1,01 
0,53 
0,87 
0,76 
0,48 
0,89 
0,84 
0,57 
0,62 
1,18 
0,7 
0,73 
0,62 
0,62 Mauritius 
Source Morocco 
countries 
Net trade 
effect (in %) Mozambique 
Albania Nepal 
Algeria Nicaragua 
Angola Niger 
Argentina Nigeria 
Bahrain Oman 
Bangladesh Pakistan 
Barbados Panama 
Belize Papua N.Guinea 
Benin Paraguay 
Bolivia Peru 
Brazil Philippines 
Bulgaria Qatar 
Burkina Faso Romania 
Burundi Rwanda 
Cambodia Saudi Arabia 
Cameroon Senegal 
Chad Seychelles 
Chile South Africa 
China Sri Lanka 
Colombia Sudan 
Congo Syria 
Costa Rica Tanzania 
CoteD′Ivoire Thailand 
Cyprus Togo 
Dem.Rep.Congo Trinidad and Tbg 
Dominican Rep. Tunisia 
Ecuador Uganda 
Egypt UAE 
El Salvador Uruguay 
Eq.Guinea Venezuela 
Ethiopia Vietnam 
Fiji Yemen 
Gabon Zambia 
Ghana Zimbabwe 
0,51 
1,06 
-0,55 
0,44 
0,28 
-0,16 
-5,73 
0,16 
0,53 
0,07 
0,13 
-1,15 
1,52 
0,56 
0,33 
1,19 
-2,6 
0,74 
-0,6 
0,38 
2,58 
0,47 
0,24 
0,52 
0,47 
0,43 
0,42 
-0,67 
0,45 
0,39 
0,15 
0,06 
0,33 
0,07 
0,87 
0,42 
1,17 
-1,24 
0,33 
0,2 
0,47 
0,31 
0,52 
0,36 
0,73 
-4,31 
0,16 
0,63 
0,36 
0,02 
0,24 
0,19 
0,44 
0,56 
0,46 
Guatemala 
-3,49 
0,47 
0,12 
0,27 
0,22 
0,45 
-6,99 
-2,69 
0,63 
0,34 
0,39 
0,11 
0,56 
1,19 
0,51 
0,56 
0,57 
0,18 
0,43 
0,15 
1,24 
0,06 
0,57 
-3,05 
-0,12 
-0,93 
-0,22 
0,37 
-1,76 
0,09 
0,57 
-0,95 
0,38 
0,69 
-0,19    
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Figure A1.1: A 10% increase in total immigrant stock and Host js trade with source
countries. Estimates accounting for relatively large immigrant communities (Trade cre-
ationij > 1, see Table 5).
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Figure A1.2: A 10% increase in total immigrant stock and Source is trade with OECD
countries. Estimates accounting for relatively large immigrant communities (Trade cre-
ationij > 1, see Table 5).
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Figure A1.3: Marginal trade creation e¤ects of a 10-percent increase in mij ; model pre-
dictions accounting for relatively large immigrant communities (Trade creationij > 1, see
Table 5).
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Chapter 2
EXPATRIATES AND TRADE
The study evaluates the contribution to bilateral trade of expatriates from the OECD countries
living in less developed economies. The expatriates promote trade between the OECD countries
and their country of residence. A 10 percent increase in the size of expatriate community leads to
a 0.6 percent average increase in its OECD trade partners imports against a 2.5 percent impact of
immigrants in OECD countries. The imports-facilitating role of expatriatesnetworks is centered in
host countries with low institutional quality. In economies lying within the lowest third of the insti-
tutional quality distribution, a 10 percent increase in expatriate stock would lead to a 1.7 increase in
imports into their country of origin. The estimates on expatriates role in exports are not statistically
di¤erent from zero. The study further addresses the impact on trade of immigrant networks from
former colonies. There is some evidence that trade contribution of immigrants from past colonies
residing in former imperial powers is relatively lower.
Keywords: international trade, immigration, informal trade barriers
JEL classication: F22, O24
2.1 Introduction
There exists an extensive evidence that immigrant networks facilitate bilateral trade be-
tween their country of origin and host economies (e.g., Gould, 1993; Head and Ries, 1998;
Combes et al., 2005). The main operating mechanisms include transmission of information,
knowledge of local institutions in trade partners market, informal contract enforcement
among the networks members, and transplanted demand for home-country products. Im-
migrantsknowledge of cultural patterns, social values and organization of society in their
country of origin helps identify protable trade opportunities and works towards their suc-
cessful realization. Similarly, the ine¢ cient bureaucracy, weak legal culture and enforcement
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institutions of many countries increase trade costs that immigrants could avoid through own
enforcement rules.1
It remains ex ante unclear as to how strong these mechanisms are for expatriates from
rich economies located in generally poorer, less developed countries.2 For example, immi-
grants tend to concentrate at either the top or bottom of the host countrys occuptional
ladder (see Stalker, 2000). While signicant fraction of immigrant populations in OECD
countries occupies lower-status jobs and entrepreneurship in trade sector might be one of
few protable alternatives, the expatriates are likely to face a relatively wider range of oppor-
tunities. In addition, as advanced market economies dispose of dense trading infrastructure
and information ows, the hosts demand for expatriate networksservices might be lower.
Expatriates might be also less able to understand the actual functioning of hosts society
as compared to immigrants with links to source country. Finally, expatriatespopulations
tend to be distinctly smaller in comparison to their counterparts OECD countries.3
The present study analyzes the trade impact of expatriates from advanced market
economies such as the U.S. or Canada that are located in less developed countries, and
compares it to the trade e¤ect of immigrants in OECD economies. By using migrant stocks
of both trading partners, the approach di¤ers from the existing empirical works that typi-
cally take the perspective of a host country and relate the immigrant stocks (or ows) to
the countrys bilateral trade gures. The study also investigates the trade impact of immi-
grants from former colonies. Trade partners with former colonial relationship might have
more similar social and political institutions, so that value added of immigrantsknowledge
might relatively decrease. I test this hypothesis for a number of past colonial powers and
complement the existing empirical evidence for the UK data by Girma and Yu (2002).
The following section reviews the empirical evidence on the role of immigrant links in
1Greif (1994) describes the evolution of informal enforcement mechanisms among the 14th century
Maghribi traders in the environment where formal contracting rules were absent.
2Since migrants from advanced market economies are likely to di¤er from typical migrants from developing
countries in their income levels, access to credit or motivation to migrate, I label the former expatriates
rather than immigrants.
3On the other hand, Gould (1993) nds that the impact of immigrant networks decreases with size, thus
favoring a relatively larger role for networks from developed host economies.
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international trade. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 provide details on data sources and methodology,
Section 2.5 presents empirical results, Section 2.6 checks for the robustness of results and
the nal section concludes.
2.2 Trade and immigrant networks
Given existing data constraints, there does not exist a study evaluating the impact on
trade of immigrant communities from both trading partners. A number of authors instead
focused on a given host economy, used available gures on local immigrant populations, and
implicitly assumed that hosts overseas populations were either equal to zero or irrelevant
for bilateral trade ows. The pioneering study by Gould (1993) analyzed trade patterns of
the U.S. economy between 1970 and 1986 and estimated a 10-percent increase in immigrant
stock to boost U.S. exports by 4.7 percent and U.S. imports by 8.3 percent. Another
work by Head and Ries (1998) employed Canadian data and estimated the link between
immigration and trade to be relatively weaker (a 1.0-1.3 percent increase for exports from
and 3.1-3.9 percent for imports into Canada).4 Their successors focused on either other
OECD economies,5 and/or evaluated more detailed mechanics of the migration-trade link.6
Koneµcný (2009) is one of few studies that analyzes the migration and trade relationship
within the context of several host countries.7 Using the data on foreign-born population
located in 19 OECD-member economies, the study shows that the relative impact on trade
of immigrant networks declines with the GDP of source country, is generally smaller than
estimates from preceding studies, and the immigrant networks might actually shift trade
ows between countries.
4The stronger e¤ect for import is usually attributed to the combination of transplanted preferences channel
and network e¤ects. The transplanted preferences mechanism is driven by the immigrantsdemand for
source-country products. For exports the preference-driven link is not operative.
5Studies dealing with immigration and trade include e.g., Girma and Yu (2002) exploiting the U.K. data,
Blanes (2005) (Spain), Combes et al. (2005) (France), Law and Bryant (2005) (New Zealand), or Piperakis
(2003) (Greece). Rauch and Trindade (2002) used data on Chinese minorities in South-East Asia.
6For example, White (2007)bs study on U.S. data classies immigrantscountries of origin according to
their income, Head and Ries (1998) discuss the possible role of length of stay, Dunlevy (2006) focuses on
corruption and the role of common language.
7Other studies on trade and migration using the OECD migration data include working papers by Dolman
(2007), and Felbemayr and Toubal (2008).
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Girma and Yu (2002) extend studies focusing on the individual mechanisms at work.
The authors evaluate immigrants ability to overcome informal trade barriers related to
their source countrys social institutions. Using the UK data on the stock of immigrant
population by country of origin over 1981 and 1991, the authors argue that immigrants
from the institutionally more similar Commonwealth countries are on average less engaged
in trade with respect to immigrants generally know their source countriesmarkets and
social institutions, the benets of this knowledge become lower once the concerned country
is institutionally close to their current location, which in turn reduces immigrantsincentive
to trade. The complementary evidence on the role of institutional quality and institutional
similarity in immigrantscontribution to trade (emphasized by Girma and Yu, 2002) will
be examined in more detail in the following sections.
2.3 Estimation strategy and specication
I use the gravity relationship derived by Helpman (1984) and employed by the study on
trade and immigration by Head and Ries (1998). Imports from country j into country i in an
integrated world economy with nonnegative trade costs producing symmetric di¤erentiated
products can be expressed as
Tij = sijGDPj ;
where sij corresponds to the share of products from country j that are consumed by
agents in country i, and GDPj stands for the output of country j. Trade costs distort the
pattern of trade and imply
sij =
GDPiPN
i=1GDPi
1
 ij
;
where
PN
i=1GDPi corresponds to world GDP and  ij is a trade cost parameter for
countries i and j. Putting the two terms together, taking natural logarithms, and assuming
that  ij = exp( x0ijb) with xij representing a k  1 matrix of variables a¤ecting the trade
costs and b corresponding to a k1 vector of regression coe¢ cients results into the following
empirical specication:
lnTij = b0 lnGDPiGDPj + x
0
ijb + d
0
ij + j + "ij : (2.1)
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The gravity relationship thus proportionally links trade ows to the incomes of trading
economies.
The vector xij in Equation 2.1 contains a number of factors a¤ecting costs of trade
between countries i and j. Immigrant and expatriate networks assumed to reduce trade costs
are measured by the natural logarithms of migrant stocks located in both trading partners.
This specication has been used in a number of existing studies on immigrant networks
and international trade (e.g., Girma and Yu, 2002; Head and Ries, 1998; or Herander and
Saavedra, 2005). The natural logarithm of distance between trading partners represents a
proxy for transportation costs. Dummies for colonial past and language allow for di¤erential
propensity to trade given that trade partners share common colonial past or speak common
language.
For the evaluation of Girma and Yu (2002)s hypothesis of minor impact of immigrant
networks from former colonies, vector xij contains a binary indicator equal to one for ob-
servations containing a former imperial power and her past colony. This measure covers
developing countries that are either member countries of the Commonwealth, or have been
French, Spanish, Dutch, Portugese, Belgian, Italian or German colonies. Alternative prox-
ies used in the estimation are the interaction terms of the natural logarithm of migrant
stocks with dummy variables describing separately each of former imperial powers (the
U.K., France, Spain and others) and their colonies. Additional interaction terms of immi-
grant networks with index of institutional quality and dummy for common language have
been created to control for the possibility of a relatively larger role of immigrants from
institutionally weaker countries and countries speaking di¤erent languages (see Dunlevy,
2006).
Equation 2.1 is augmented by d 0ij , a 1  (i + j) vector of country j and i xed e¤ects.
j correponds to an error term correlated within the OECD economy j. The error term "ij
is specic to each country pair ij and independent of other errors. To account for within-
group correlation and heteroscedasticity within the OECD economies, I adopt xed e¤ects
and clustered-errors approach by Liang and Zeger (1986). The robust covariance estimator
by Liang and Zeger (1986) should thus account for any remaining within-group correlation
in excess of js xed e¤ects.
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2.4 Data
The estimation of expatriate networks e¤ects has been until now impossible due to the
absence of information on foreign-born populations in developing economies that typically
form the source of migration. The present study uses a recently published database on inter-
national bilateral migration stocks compiled by the University of Sussex and the World Bank
compiled by Parson et al. (2007). The database provides unique data on stocks of foreign-
born population in advanced market economies and developing countries. The database
consists of a 226 x 226 matrix containing migrants by country of birth (i.e., the foreign-born
population). The information was collected from the year 2000 round of censuses whenever
possible, and older data were included where such information was unavailable. Using a
variety of techniques, Parson et al. (2007) estimated the missing data and reconciled all the
available information to create a complete matrix of international bilateral migrant stocks.
The data on bilateral exports and imports have been obtained from the Direction of
Trade Statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund. I employ ve-year averages
of real trade volumes over 1999-2003, instead of using the data for a single year in order to
reduce the additional problem with zero observed exports and imports for some countries
and years.8 A measure of circle distance between capital cities has been retrieved from Jon
Havemans web page or added manually if values were missing.9
I use ve-year averages (1999-2003) of the restricted Index of Economic Freedom as a
measure of institutional quality. The Index of Economic Freedom produced by the Heritage
Foundation compiles evaluations of nine areas essential for the functioning market envi-
ronment. The restricted version includes only those areas that most closely relate to the
institutional quality in trade context - corruption, non-tari¤ trade barriers, rule of law and
regulatory burden - and drops ination, scal burden, restrictions on banks, labor regula-
tion and government intervention. Finally, gures on GDP and GDP per capita have been
8Dunlevy (2006) uses a similar approach by averaging bilateral export data at the U.S. state level over
1990-1992. The current sample contains 157 pairs with imports and 69 pairs with exports below 100 thd
U.S. dollars over the ve-year period. Nonetheless, the random-e¤ect tobit estimates with host-country
dummies lead to very similar results (both qualitatively and quantitatively).
9Jon Havemans web page is available at http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/ HAVE-
MAN/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Gravity.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Importsxij 2,409 409.08 3,438.94 0 120,767.4
Exportsxij 2,641 283.41 2,064.99 0 94,023.73
OECD economies
GDPxxi 2,641 947,000 1,870,000 19,400 9,012,508
GDP per capitai 2,641 25,391.18 8,063.58 11,958.24 49,045.66
Immigrant stockij 2,641 19,420 197,533.6 1 9,336,719
Inst.qualityi 2,641 74.55 5.93 60,7 81
Developing economies
GDPxxj 2,586 51,400 1,350,000 206 1,027,513
GDP per capitaj 2,641 3,020.99 4,592.12 0 24,715.53
Expatriate stockj 2,641 1,902.96 12,608.22 0 342,137
Inst.qualityj 2,604 46.21 15.86 13,8 92,5
Other variables
Distanceij 2,641 6,938.22 3,849.23 200 19,158.67
Common languageij 2,641 0.06 0.23 0 1
Colonial relationshipij 2,641 0.03 0.17 0 1
x Trade gures from the perspective of OECD countries
xx in millions of 1998 U.S.dollars
collected from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. To avoid
the potential endogeneity problem of the GDP variable, GDP and GDP per capita gures
from 1998 have been used as proxies. Table 2.1 contains summary statistics for all variables
of interest.10 The following subsections discuss the estimation results for both exports
and imports.
2.5 Empirical results
Table 2.2 reports the estimated coe¢ cients from regressions with the natural logarithm of
exports from and imports to the OECD countries as dependent variables, xed e¤ects for
10Table A2.1 in Appendix A2 presents the full list of 21 advanced market economies and 135 less developed
economies that passed the data availibility constraints. The use of the terms exports and imports in the
text always refers to the direction of trade from the perspective of the advanced market economy. The
terms developing and less developed economies in the text will be used interchangeably.
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both trade partners, and clustering by OECD economies.11 Columns (1) and (4) deliver
estimates from benchmark regressions absent interaction terms and the expatriatesnet-
works variable. The coe¢ cients have expected signs and reasonable values. The estimate
on immigrant networks located in the OECD economies is smaller than the corresponding
coe¢ cient in the imports equation, which is in accord with the numerous empirical evi-
dence (e.g., Gould, 1993; Head and Ries, 1998) and the hypothesis that while immigrants
in advanced market economies in general promote both exports and imports through the
reduction of trade costs and demand for source-country products, in case of exports from
host country the latter channel should be absent. The estimates suggest that a 10-percent
increase in the size of immigrant stock in a given OECD country would promote the coun-
trys exports by 2 percent and imports by 2.9 percent on average, which is slightly above
the middle of the range provided by the existing literature.1213
The adjacent columns include the proxy for expatriates networks. According to the
estimates from regressions with the added expatriates variable, a 10-percent increase in the
trade partners immigrant population in the OECD economies would boost the countrys
exports by 1.8 and imports by 2.6 percent. The results with the added expatriate variable in
Columns (2) and (5) thus maintain the previous conclusions with respect to the immigrant
network term. The newly introduced expatriates facilitate imports by the average 0.3-0.5
percent after a 10 percent increase, the actual level depending on the direction of bilateral
trade ow. The estimated trade impact of expatriate networks is nonetheless statistically
not di¤erent from zero.
Columns (3) and (6) provide some additional insights into the benchmark model. For
exports, the added interactions of migrant variables with proxies for institutional quality
11The coe¢ cient estimates on the interactions of migrant terms with dummies for common language are
presented in the Appendix A2 (together with the remaining output). None of the coe¢ cients passed
10-percent signicance level and in some cases had the opposite sign.
12E.g., a static version of the model by Girma and Yu (2002) produces a 1.6 percent increase in UK exports
and a 1 percent rise in UK imports from non-Commonwealth economies. Head and Ries (1998) estimate
a 1-1.3 percent boost for Canadian bilateral exports and 3.1-3.9 percent for imports. The study on U.S.
exports by Herander and Saavedra (2005) states 1.6 percent.
13For a complete list of all explanatory variables and estimation results for exports see Columns (1)-(3) in
Table A2.2 in Appendix A2. For the corresponding import estimates see Columns (1)-(3) in Table A2.3
in Appendix A2.
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Table 2.2: Fixed e¤ects results with ln exports and ln imports as dependent variable.
Ln(Exports)ij Ln(Imports)ij
Dependent variables$ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln immigrant stockij 0.202 0.182 0.239 0.292 0.262 0.146
(0.028)y (0.030) (0.063) (0.032) (0.03) (0.049)
Ln expatriate stockij - 0.030 0.049 - 0.053 0.342
(0.028) (0.057) (0.036) (0.106)
Inst. qualityij x Ln immsij - - -0.001 - - 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Inst. qualityij x Ln expatsij - - 0.000 - - -0.006
(0.001) (0.002)
Colonial relationshipij - - 0.002 - - -0.053
x Ln immsij (0.092) (0.081)
Colonial relationshipij - - -0.063 - - -0.026
x Ln expatsij (0.049) (0.062)
R2 0.483 0.482 0.448 0.404 0.412 0.375
Obs. 2,641 2,516 2,498 2,427 2,340 2,321
$For complete estimates see Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in Appendix 2A.
xStandard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** - signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
yStandard errors account for clustering by host country.
and shared colonial past change neither the qualitative nor quantitative conclusions with
respect to immigrant and expatriate e¤ects. On the other hand, both networks have sta-
tistically signicant e¤ect on imports into the OECD countries. The institutional quality
interactions in import equations are signicant, suggesting considerable heterogeneity of
the immigrant and expatriate e¤ects across less developed economies. Taking the average
value of the institutional quality term across developing countries (46.2), a 10-percent rise in
the immigrant networkssize implies 2.7-percent increase in imports, in case of expatriates
the e¤ect amounts to 0.6 percent. The quantitative conclusions thus remain the same as
those based on the coe¢ cient estimates from columns (3) and (4), yet have now become
statistically signicant also for expatriates from OECD countries.
The positive and signicant sign on the immigrantsinteraction with institutional quality
in Column (6) is not in line with studies suggesting weaker immigration-trade link for less
corrupt countries (see Dunlevy, 2006). The present results have been, however, obtained
from di¤erent dataset. The set of less developed economies in the present study excludes
the advanced economies as providers of immigrants and exploits additional heterogeneity
among less developed economies in the sample.
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Table 2.3: Fixed e¤ect estimates di¤erentiating migrants impact on trade by tertiles of
institutional quality distribution.
Ln(Exports)ij Ln(Imports)ij
Dependent variables$ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln immigrant stockij 0.239 0.212 0.146 0.222
(0.063) (0.042) (0.049) (0.034)
Ln expatriate stockij 0.049 0.044 0.342 0.17
(0.057) (0.041) (0.106) (0.061)
Inst. qualityij x Ln immsij -0.001 - 0.003 -
(0.001) (0.001)
Inst. quality dummies - - - -
- 2nd tertile x Ln immsij - -0.032 - 0.054
(0.024) (0.044)
- 3rd tertile x Ln immsij - -0.065 - 0.068
(0.043) (0.049)
Inst. qualityij x Ln expatsij 0.000 - -0.006 -
(0.001) (0.002)
Inst. quality dummies
- 2nd tertile x Ln expatsij - 0.003 - -0.109
(0.039) (0.052)
- 3rd tertile x Ln expatsij - -0.010 - -0.18
(0.038) (0.069)
R2 0.448 0.442 0.375 0.385
Obs. 2,498 2,498 2,321 2,321
$For complete estimates see Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in Appendix 2A.
xStandard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** - signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
yStandard errors account for clustering by host country.
The results presented in Table 2.2 provide a rather mixed picture. While the estimates on
the e¤ect of immigrant networks generally conform to the existing literature, the expatriates
contribution seems to be relatively smaller, limited only on imports into OECD countries,
and relevant mainly for agents located in less institutionally developed countries. The
following two tables provide a more detailed perspective on immigrant and expatriatesrole
in trade between their host and source countries.
Columns (1) and (3) in Table 2.3 report the estimates from the benchmark xed-e¤ect
specication with the interactions of the migrant terms and the continuous institutional
quality index values. For Columns (2) and (4), I recoded the institutional quality measure
into three binary variables, each indicating the location within the quality index distribution,
and created the interactions of migrant terms with the dummies for the middle or top of
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Table 2.4: The estimated interactions of migrant network terms and colonial past.
Ln(Exports)ij Ln(Imports)ij
Dependent variables$ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln immigrant stockij 0.239 0.228 0.146 0.145
(0.063) (0.058) (0.049) (0.051)
Ln expatriate stockij 0.049 0.029 0.342 0.33
(0.057) (0.06) (0.106) (0.11)
Colonial relationshipij 0.002 - -0.053 -
x Ln immsij (0.092) (0.081)
Colonial power dummies
- Spain x Ln immsij - -0.010 - -0.174
(0.094) (0.086)
- France x Ln immsij - -0.004 - -0.12**
(0.064) (0.053)
- UK x Ln immsij - -0.008 - -0.041
(0.073) (0.077)
- Others x Ln immsij - 0.117 - -0.023
(0.155) (0.124)
Colonial relationshipij -0.063 - -0.026 -
x Ln expatsij (0.049) (0.062)
Colonial power dummies
- Spain x Ln expatsij - -0.027 - 0.013
(0.083) (0.09)
- France x Ln expatsij - 0.03 - 0.075
(0.047) (0.055)
- UK x Ln expatsij - -0.05 - -0.048
(0.047) (0.053)
- Others x Ln expatsij - -0.039 - -0.022
(0.099) (0.087)
R2 0.448 0.442 0.375 0.376
Obs. 2,498 2,498 2,321 2,321
$Fixed-e¤ects specication. For complete estimates see Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in Appendix 2A.
xStandard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** - signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
yStandard errors account for clustering by host country.
the distribution part.14
The estimated interactions provide information on the parts of the institutional quality
distribution that drive the results. For the immigrant networks the role of institutional
quality is relatively minor, as the dummy interaction terms for either trade ow are not
statistically di¤erent from the baseline immigrant network coe¢ cient. The di¤erences be-
tween selected institutional quality groups thus seem to be spread quite uniformly over the
14For a complete list of all explanatory variables and estimation results for exports see Columns (4) and
(5) in Table A2.2 in Appendix A2. For the corresponding import estimates see Columns (4) and (5) in
Table A2.3, Appendix A2.
50
individual parts of the quality index distribution.
The overall picture changes for expatriatesnetworks. Expatriates located in economies
with lower institutional quality are the only ones that on average support bilateral exports
from the OECD countries. The marginal impact on trade of expatriates from the top two
thirds of the institutional quality distribution is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
The signs of the interactions with colonial past dummies in most cases conform to the
expectations. They are, however, not statistically signicant and thus provide a rather
limited statistical support for the links between the institutional similarity (as proxied by
shared colonial past) and trade e¤ects of migrant networks presented, e.g., in Girma and
Yu (2002). The situation changes for imports, once the colonial interaction terms become
replaced by the interactions of migrant terms and four separate dummies for former colonies
of the U.K., France, Spain, and the remaining imperial powers. As can be seen from the
coe¢ cient estimates in Column (4), while the results for the UK fails to pass the usual
signicance levels, the corresponding interactions for Spain and France do.
The role of expatriates from former colonial powers (as opposed to immigrants) seems
to be no di¤erent from the role of other migrants located in countries without shared colo-
nial past.15 The next subsection discusses the results for exports from advanced market
economies.
2.5.1 The immigrant vs. expatriate e¤ects
The estimates on immigrant and expatriate e¤ects on trade point to the importance of
the characteristics and the relative position of both host and source countries. Should the
relationship between immigrant/expatriate networks and bilateral trade ows be identical
irrespective of the characteristics of country of origin and host country, one should observe
expatriate networks promote the OECD economys exports in the same way as immigrants
promote its imports. The expatriatesimpact on exports should furthermore exceed their
e¤ect on imports, where the transplanted-preferences channel discussed in previous sections
is absent and the sole trade-facilitating force should operate through the reduction of trade
15Complete results on both imports and exports can be found in Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix A2.
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costs. Yet none of the two cases holds true, as expatriates contribution to trade falls
short of that of immigrant networks and expatriates promote only imports into OECD from
institutionally weaker countries.
The present results thus suggest that the incentives and functioning of immigrant net-
works in the OECD economes seem to be qualitatively di¤erent from expatriate networks
residing in less developed countries.
Part of this di¤erence, namely lower coe¢ cients on expatriate networks with respect to
their immigrant counterparts located in developed economies, are consistent with the study
by White (2007a). The author nds that immigrants coming from lower-income countries
contribute more to bilateral trade. His argument based on the evaluation of the U.S. data
claims that to the extent that lower-income economies have generally weaker contracting
and enforcement mechanisms, immigrants from such countries might better exploit their
source countryknowledge and engage in protable trade opportunities.
Expatriatesknowledge, on the other hand, would likely be in relatively lower demand
given the dense trading infrastructure and information ows in their country of origin.
Furthermore, under the assumption that expatriates might be less able to understand the
cultural patterns, social values and organization of hosts society as compared to the OECD
immigrants born in less developed countries, one could also expect their trade contribution
to be relatively lower.16 Given that the institutional quality index is positively correlated
with per capita income, the estimates from Table 2.3 seem to partially capture this e¤ect.
The abovementioned nding, however, does not explain as to why the estimated expatriates
contribution to the exports of the OECD economies is lower (indeed not di¤erent from
zero) than their impact on imports,17 and why the expatriates facilitate only imports from
countries with weak institutions.
There are several potential explanations for these two e¤ects. Assume the expatriates
16The current dataset is unlikely to include managers from the OECD countries that have been sent
abroad by their employers, given that their length of stay and legal status would be di¤erent from a
typical immigrant. The trade contribution of such individuals might be notably higher if their mission is
related to foreign investments or trade contracts by their mother companies.
17The insignicance of the interaction terms in Table 2.3 suggests, that expatriates contribute to trade in
no di¤erent way than other agents of the host country.
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maximize their earnings and decide based on the relative protability of trade with respect to
other activities. Also assume that the costs of trade are negatively related to the hosting, less
developed countrys institutional quality and that the expatriatesknowledge of institutions
helps reduce these costs. Other things equal, the expatriates will be more likely to trade
in countries with relatively weaker institutions, given that net prots from trade will be
higher. Nonetheless, the potential traders also have to decide as to what direction of trade
they choose. The generally small size of expatriate communities and the prevailing low
purchasing power in less developed economies could make supplying of the hosts market
unprotable. Instead, the expatriatesattention might be directed towards supplying of the
overseas OECD markets, so that one could ultimately observe the empirical pattern found
in Table 2.3.
An alternative explanation for the expatriatesfacilitation of the OECD imports as op-
posed to exports might relate to the cross-sectional nature of the present sample. The
expatriates are likely to face a relatively wide range of business and/or employment oppor-
tunities (Stalker, 2000). While some of these opportunities (such as, e.g., the agricultural
production or the extraction of mineral resources) might over time materialize as imports
into the country of origin, the initial source-country exports they might have likewise stimu-
lated would be missing in the estimations, assuming that these investments have been made
before the observed period.18
2.6 Robustness checks
2.6.1 The role of the immigrant-network measures and migrants from other countries
Koneµcný (2009) argues for the inclusion of relative measures of immigrant networks in
addition to the commonly employed natural logarithm of immigrant stock or other level
variables. A simple gravity model in which agents produce either locally or form a joint
venture with foreign partner illustrates that the impact on trade might vary with the size
of immigrant community relative to the market size of country of origin, as well as with the
18A more detailed analysis of the particular mechanism at work would require a shift from the aggregate
data towards the information collected at the micro-level.
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overall shares of immigrant communities with respect to the populations of trade partners.
The three proposed relative measures that might inuence trade between host j and source
country i include 1) the share in host population of a given immigrant stock relative to the
country of origin GDPi, 2) the population share of the overall immigrant stock (regardless
of origin) within a given host country, and 3) the size of the overseas diaspora relative to
the population in diasporas country of origin.
The rst measure controls for the size of trade partners. Assuming that immigrants
match exclusively with agents from their country-of-origin and the rest of hosts population
searches randomly, the positive e¤ect on trade of a marginal increase in immigrant stock
would on average rise with the stocks share in host country and its relative size with respect
to the source country market. The second measure controls for the possibly negative e¤ects
on bilateral trade of immigrant links of immigrant communities from other source countries.
The more immigrants in a given host country match with their countries of origin, the lower
will be the probability of hosts native agents to trade with given trade partner. Finally,
the third measure accounts for the potentially negative bilateral trade e¤ects of source
country diasporas located in other countries. The larger is the overall diaspora relative to
the population of country of origin, the lower are the chances of hosts native agents to nd
a match in concerned source country.19
Since the xed-e¤ect specication employed in previous sections precludes the estima-
tion of country-level relative measures potentially a¤ecting trade, I adopt a two-stage ver-
sion of Equation 2.1 using the methodology developed by Donald nad Lang (2007). The
two-step procedure starts with the OLS regression of the natural logarithm of bilateral
exports/imports on variables di¤ering across country pairs ij, country j- and i-xed e¤ects:
1st stage: lnTij = b0 lnGDPiGDPj + x0ijb + a0
mij
Nj
GDPi
GDPI
+ d 0ij + "ij ;
where the term following coe¢ cient a0 is the newly added share in host population of a
given immigrant stock relative to the country of origin GDPi.
In the second stage, I run feasible GLS with the relevant xed e¤ect coe¢ cient estimates
19For a detailed exposition to the assumptions and mechanisms driving the results, see Koneµcný (2009).
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from the rst stage as dependent variables and country i- (or j-) level variables on the right-
hand side of the regression:
2nd stage: d^j = c(J) + x0jz + a1
PI
i=1mij
Nj
+ uj ; var^(uj) = ^
2I (J ) + d^j (2.2)
and d^i = c(I) + x0iw + a2
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
+ ui; var^(ui) = ^
2I (I ) + d^i ; (2.3)
where Equation 2.2 estimates the coe¢ cient on the host trade diversion term, Equation
2.3 estimates the coe¢ cient on the source trade diversion term, and var^(ufj;ig) stands for
the variance of the respective 2nd-stage error term ufj;ig. The vectors of country-specic
terms xi and xj include the natural logartihms of real GDP and GDP per capita, the
corresponding relative measure, share of exports in GDP, and the Heritage Foundation
measure of institutional quality.
PI
i=1mij
Nj
stands for the population share of the overall
immigrant stock (regardless of origin) within a given host country,
PJ
j=1mij
Ni
represents the
size of the overseas diaspora relative to the population in diasporas country of origin. The
GLS procedure uses xed e¤ect covariance estimates fd^j ;d^ig from the 1st stage for the
construction of weights.20 Table 2.5 presents the results using Donald and Lang (2007)s
2-step estimation procedure.
The estimatessigns conform to the ex ante expectations. The trade impact of immigrant
and expatriate stocks has remained statistically signicant despite a slight decrease in levels,
and the expatriate network term in the exports equation in Column (2) remains signicant
at 10% level. Despite the consistency with immigrant-driven shifts in trade ows modelled
in Koneµcný (2009), the overall net e¤ect of immigrant networks on aggregate trade is still
nonnegative.
2.6.2 Endogeneity and large migrant populations
The studys results from previous sections might be subject to the potential endogeneity of
migrant network terms. Over time, trade partners could learn about the living conditions in
20For more details see Donald and Lang (2006), p. 224-225.
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Table 2.5: Regression results including relative measures of immigrant networks.
Ln(Exports)ij Ln(Imports)ij
Dependent variables$ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln immigrant stockij 0.183*** 0.159*** 0.281*** .251***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.025)
Ln expatriate stockij - 0.035* - 0.060**
(0.020) (0.030)
Immigrant stockij relative 0.239*** 0.245*** 0.201** 0.181**
to country of origin GDPi (0.078) (0.072) (0.074) (0.089)
Share of overall imm. stock -9.637* -9.042 -6.411 -5.465
in OECD country (5.193) (5.330) (4.600) (4.609)
Overseas diaspora -0.617 -0.684 -2.041* -1.342
relative to country of origin (0.765) (0.779) (1.076) (1.084)
R2 0.483 0.482 0.404 0.412
Obs. 2,585 2,460 2,378 2,291
$2-step estimates Donald and Lang (2007).
xStandard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** - signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
the other country and might pass the information further to potential migrants. Trade might
provide employment opportunities within the immigrant/expatriate communities engaged
in trading21 and thus reduce the ex ante uncertainty of agents considering migration.
Javorcik et al. (2006) used the natural logarithm of population density and the share
of passport costs in real GDP per capita as instruments for migrant networks in their
study on the link between migration and FDI. The correlations between these variables22
and the stock of immigrants in the current data are, however, negligible (-0.01 and -0.03,
respectively), and in the case of population density even with the opposite sign.23
The correlations of the two instrumental variables (IVs) and migrant levels when all
expressed in natural logarithms are higher (0.13 and -0.06, respectively). In the 2SLS re-
gressions on exports and imports with the logartihms of both IVs and the natural logartihm
21Pengs (1998) survey on the characteristics of trade intermediaries located in the U.S. reported 40 percent
of U.S. intermediarieso¢ cers or managers to be foreign-born.
22The instruments have been taken from McKenzie (2005).
23A similar result has been found in Koneµcný (2009).
56
of immigrant stock as the instrumented variable, the Shea partial R-squared failed to pass
0.01 for any combination of the instruments, the coe¢ cients on instrumental variables had
theoretically implausible signs, and joint F-tests in the rst stage did not prove to be sig-
nicant. The weakness of the available instruments thus precludes the quantication of the
degree of endogeneity.
The data might also contain inuential observations driving the estimation results. To
check for this possibility, I estimate the benchmark regressions without country pairs that
exceeded critical values of the dfbeta test on inuential obervations in Stata. The same ex-
ercise has been repeated for expatriate stocks. The results remain nonetheless qualitatively
the same.
2.7 Conclusion
The study evaluates the contribution of expatriate networks to bilateral trade between host
and source countries, a topic that has not been studied by previous studies due to pending
data constraints. The study shows that similarly to immigrants in OECD countries, the
expatriates from advanced market economies seem to facilitate bilateral trade with their
country of origin. The expatriatescontribution to trade (as compared to immigrants located
in OECD) is rather limited and seems to operate through di¤erent mechanisms. Following
a 10 percent increase in the size of expatriate community, the predicted average increase in
imports into OECD economies revolves around 0.6 percent. The same increase in immigrant
stock, on the other hand, would correspond to more than 2.5 percent change. The trade
facilitating role of expatriatesnetworks becomes most evident in host countries with low
institutional quality. In economies lying within the lowest third of the institutional quality
distribution, a 10 percent increase in expatriate stock would result to a predicted 1.7 increase
in imports into their country of origin. For the remaining parts of the distributions as well
as for exports, the study did not nd any empirical evidence on expatriatesinvolvement.
A more detailed analysis of individual mechanisms at work would call for the use of more
detailed, micro-level information instead of the commonly used data on aggregate migrant
stocks.
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The study has besides addressed the cross-sample validity of the ndings by Girma
and Yu (2002) on the interactions between the migrant network variables and institutional
similarity proxied by shared colonial past. The estimations reveal that there is some, though
not particularly strong, evidence that the trade contribution of immigrant networks from
past colonies operating in former imperial powers is relatively lower.
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2.8 Appendix A2
Table A2.1: Countries in the sample.
OECD economies Less developed economies
Australia Albania Georgia Pakistan
Austria Algeria Ghana Panama
Belgium Angola Guatemala Pakistan
Canada Argentina Guinea Panama
Denmark Armenia Guinea-Bissau Papua N.Guinea
Finland Azerbaijan Guyana Paraguay
France Bahamas Haiti Peru
Germany Bahrain Honduras Philippines
Greece Bangladesh Hong Kong Poland
Ireland Barbados Hungary Qatar
Italy Belarus India Romania
Luxembourg Belize Indonesia Russian Fed.
Netherlands Benin Iran Rwanda
New Zealand Bolivia Iraq Samoa
Norway Bosnia and Hrzg Israel Saudi Arabia
Portugal Botswana Jamaica Senegal
Spain Brazil Jordan Sierra Leone
Sweden Bulgaria Kazakhstan Singapore
Switzerland BurkinaFaso Kenya Slovakia
UK Burundi Kuwait Slovenia
USA Cambodia Kyrgyzstan Somalia
Cameroon Latvia SouthAfrica
CapeVerde Lebanon SriLanka
Centr.Afr.Rep. Lesotho Sudan
Chad Libya Suriname
Chile Lithuania Swaziland
China former Yugoslavia Syria
Colombia Madagascar Tajikistan
Congo Malawi Tanzania
Costa Rica Malaysia Thailand
Cote d0Ivoire Mali Togo
Croatia Malta Trinidad and Tbg
Cuba Mauritania Tunisia
Cyprus Mauritius Turkey
Czech Republic Mexico Turkmenistan
Djibouti Moldova Uganda
Dominican Rep. Mongolia Ukraine
Ecuador Morocco UAE
Egypt Mozambique Uruguay
El Salvador Myanmar Uzbekistan
Eq. Guinea Namibia Venezuela
Estonia Nepal Vietnam
Ethiopia Nicaragua Yemen
Fiji Niger Zambia
Gabon Nigeria Zimbabwe
Gambia Oman
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Table A2.2: Regression results with ln exports as dependent variable.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln immigrant stockij 0.202 0.182 0.239 0.212 0.228
(0.028) (0.030) (0.063) (0.042) (0.058)
Ln expatriate stockij - 0.030 0.049 0.044 0.029
(0.028) (0.057) (0.041) (0.06)
Inst. qualityij x Ln immsij - - -0.001 - -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Inst. quality dummies
- 2nd tertile x Ln immsij - - - -0.032 -
(0.024)
- 3rd tertile x Ln immsij - - - -0.065 -
(0.043)
Inst. qualityij x Ln expatsij - - 0.000 - 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Inst. quality dummies
- 2nd tertile x Ln expatsij - - - 0.003 -
(0.039)
- 3rd tertile x Ln expatsij - - - -0.010 -
(0.038)
Colonial relationshipij - - 0.002 0.012 -
x Ln immsij (0.092) (0.093)
Colonial power dummies
- Spain x Ln immsij - - - - -0.010
(0.094)
- France x Ln immsij - - - - -0.004
(0.064)
- UK x Ln immsij - - - - -0.008
(0.073)
- Others x Ln immsij - - - - 0.117
(0.155)
Colonial relationshipij x - - -0.063 -0.064 -
Ln expatsij (0.049) (0.05)
Colonial power dummies
- Spain x Ln expatsij - - - - -0.027
(0.083)
- France x Ln expatsij - - - - 0.03
(0.047)
- UK x Ln expatsij - - - - -0.05
(0.047)
- Others x Ln expatsij - - - - -0.039
(0.099)
Common languageij - - -0.052 -0.058 -0.037
x Ln immsij (0.082) (0.082) (0.084)
Common languageij - - 0.04 0.041 0.028
x Ln expatsij (0.048) (0.05) (0.054)
R2 0.483 0.482 0.448 0.442 0.452
Obs. 2,641 2,516 2,498 2,498 2,498
xStandard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** - signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table A2.3: Regression results with ln imports as dependent variable.
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln immigrant stockij 0.292 0.262 0.146 0.222 0.145
(0.032) (0.03) (0.049) (0.034) (0.051)
Ln expatriate stockij - 0.053 0.342 0.17 0.33
(0.036) (0.106) (0.061) (0.11)
Inst. qualityij x Ln immsij - - 0.003 - 0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Inst. quality dummies
- 2nd tertile x Ln immsij - - - 0.054 -
(0.044)
- 3rd tertile x Ln immsij - - - 0.068 -
(0.049)
Inst. qualityij x Ln expatsij - - -0.006 - -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Inst. quality dummies
- 2nd tertile x Ln expatsij - - - -0.109 -
(0.052)
- 3rd tertile x Ln expatsij - - - -0.18 -
(0.069)
Colonial relationshipij - - -0.053 -0.052 -
x Ln immsij (0.081) (0.083)
Colonial power dummies
- Spain x Ln immsij - - - - -0.174
(0.086)
- France x Ln immsij - - - - -0.12**
(0.053)
- UK x Ln immsij - - - - -0.041
(0.077)
- Others x Ln immsij - - - - -0.023
(0.124)
Colonial relationshipij x - - -0.026 -0.024 -
Ln expatsij (0.062) (0.062)
Colonial power dummies
- Spain x Ln expatsij - - - - 0.013
(0.09)
- France x Ln expatsij - - - - 0.075
(0.055)
- UK x Ln expatsij - - - - -0.048
(0.053)
- Others x Ln expatsij - - - - -0.022
(0.087)
Common languageij - - -0.032 -0.032 -0.041
x Ln immsij (0.058) (0.064) (0.058)
Common languageij - - -0.059 -0.062 -0.058
x Ln expatsij (0.041) (0.044) (0.043)
R2 0.404 0.412 0.375 0.385 0.376
Obs. 2,427 2,340 2,321 2,321 2,321
xStandard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** - signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table A2.4: Correlation table for trade ows and migrant stocks.
Ln Importsij Ln Exportsij Ln Imm stockij Ln Expatsij
Ln Importsij 1
Ln Exportsij 0,812 1
Ln Immigrant stockij 0,633 0,659 1
Ln Expatriatesij 0,559 0,562 0,543 1
Table A2.5: Country pairs in the sample with common colonial past.
Mother country Colony Mother country Colony
Belgium Burundi Spain Costa Rica
Rwanda Cuba
France Benin Dominican Rep.
Burkina Faso Ecuador
Cambodia El Salvador
Cameroon Eq. Guinea
Chad Guatemala
Congo Honduras
Cote d0Ivoire Jamaica
Djibouti Mexico
Gabon Morocco
Guinea Nicaragua
Haiti Paraguay
Lebanon Peru
Madagascar Philippines
Mali Uruguay
Mauritania UK Bangladesh
Mauritius Barbados
Morocco Cyprus
Niger Ghana
Senegal Guyana
Togo Hong Kong
Tunisia India
Vietnam Jamaica
Italy Ethiopia Kenya
Libya Malaysia
Somalia Malta
Netherlands Guyana Mauritius
Indonesia Nigeria
Suriname Pakistan
Portugal Angola Sierra Leone
Brazil South Africa
Cape Verde SriLanka
Guinea-Bissau Tanzania
Mozambique Trinidad and Tbg
Spain Argentina Uganda
Bolivia Zambia
Chile Zimbabwe
Colombia
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Chapter 3
FAIR TRADE - IS IT REALLY FAIR?
(written jointly with Jan Mysliveµcek)
One of the arguments against the Fair Trade scheme is that the guaranteed minimum price tends
to depress world prices and thus the incomes of non-participating farmers (e. g. The Economist,
2006). We develop a model that distinguishes between the impact of the introduction of a Fair Trade
market per se and the e¤ect of minimum pri ce policies given that a Fair Trade market actually ex-
ists. The model suggests that the claims against Fair Trade might not be correct. The introduction
of a Fair Trade ma rket reduces information asymmetries between the trading parties and dampens
the market power of middlemen. Improved matching and lower margins of the middlemen have the
c apacity to increase the incomes of both participating and non-participating farmers. The mini-
mum contracting price as part of Fair Trade standards, however, precludes the full realization of the
programs potential benets by reducing farmerspayo¤s relative to the free-contracting alternative.
The minimum price also paradoxically increa ses the prots of the middlemen whose local monop-
sony power the Fair Trade scheme originally aimed to retrench.
Keywords: Certication, regulation, price setting, co¤ee, Fair Trade, monopsony
JEL classication: D18, D21, D43, D45, D71, J51, Q17, Q56
3.1 Introduction
As Fair Trade-certied products gradually move from specialized shops to supermarket
shelves, the actual impact and potential of Fair Trade has become an increasingly discussed
topic. Academics, journalists and policymakers as well as NGOs and other stakeholders
involved in the Fair Trade scheme present their worries and expectations regarding the
movements actual capacity to improve the livelihoods of poor people. Besides the common
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assertion that Fair Trade certication helps marginalized producers through guaranteed
minimum prices and other provisions like access to pre-nance or market information FLO
(2007), the most vocal concerns of Fair Trade opponents relate to the excess Fair Trade
supply, the impact on non-participating producers, and the uncertain nature of Fair Trade
demand (The Economist, 2006; Washington Post, 2005; Weber, 2007, etc.).1 These opinions
certainly deserve a more detailed analysis as the potential reach of Fair Trade extends to
millions of households living in poverty.
This paper aims to address some of the most frequently expressed concerns relating
to the Fair Trade certication scheme, namely the excess of Fair Trade supply due to the
guaranteed minimum price, the impact on non-participating producers, and the limited
scope of Fair Trade demand. In particular, it aims to answer the following questions: What
is the impact of the introduction of Fair Trade markets on farmers incomes? Does the
guaranteed Fair Trade price disadvantage those producers who do not engage in Fair Trade
compared with those who do? How do the costs and benets of the scheme depend on the
structure of global markets?
We develop a simple framework incorporating the empirical regularities of the largest and
most successful Fair Trade market co¤ee. Within this framework we distinguish between
the impact of the introduction of a market with Fair Trade-certied products2 and the e¤ect
of minimum price policies given that a Fair Trade market actually exists. Furthermore, we
study the link between the two above-mentioned measures and the behavior of middlemen
operating in regional co¤ee markets.
The following section provides a brief expose of the structural changes on the global
co¤ee market in the 90s and the success of Fair Trade-labelled co¤ee. Section 3.3 reviews the
organization of the Fair Trade labelling scheme and the major arguments favoring the Fair
1There are, of course, additional arguments against Fair Trade such as the ine¢ ciencies in processing and
distribution due to Fair Trades bypassing of specialized intermediaries exploiting economies of scale. Fair
Trade has also been criticised as yet another instrument for price discrimination across customers. For
the sake of clarity, our paper does not address these issues and instead focuses exclusively on the excess
supply argument and the corresponding impact on farmers.
2The assumption that there indeed exists a demand for such products can be justied by Andreoni
(1990)s "warm glow" e¤ect. In the present context, the "warm glow" e¤ect reects the additional utility
due to the consumption of co¤ee grown under "fair" standards.
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Trade idea. Section 3.4 develops a model that addresses some of the benets and concerns
relating to Fair Trade in a simple framework rst without monopsonistic middlemen and
then with the middlemen that control access to world markets. For ease of exposition,
Section 3.4 also contains the numerical results obtained from explicit supply and demand
structures. The nal section concludes.
3.2 Fair Trade and the global co¤ee market
The Fair Trade idea is usually associated with co¤ee, the most successful Fair Trade com-
modity with the largest share in total sales and the longest history among traded Fair
Trade commodities.3 The growth of Fair Trade can be neatly illustrated by the story of
this commodity. The yearly average increase in total sales volume of Fair Trade co¤ee over
the period 2001-2006 amounted to 27%, with growth rates increasing on a yearly basis and
reaching as much as 53% in 2006 FLO (2007). The extraordinary growth can be attributed
mostly to the expanding markets in the United States, where only in 2006 the sales volumes
more than doubled. Nonetheless, in Europe with its 79,000 sales points, the market shares
of Fair Trade co¤ee have been likewise increasing substantially. In the United Kingdom, the
market share of ground Fair Trade co¤ee increased from 1.5% in 1999 to 20% in 2004 (FINE,
2005).4 While in other European countries the growth rates and market shares have been
more modest, they still exceed the annual growth of world co¤ee demand (0.4%) by an order
of magnitude. Hence, despite a still negligible share in the overall world co¤ee consumption
(0.8% out of a total 6.7 million tons in 2006, FLO, 2007 and ICO, 2007),5the continuing
3 In North America, co¤ee accounted for 34% of all Fair Trade sales in 2003 (EFTA, 1998). According
to the European Commission (1999), the estimated share of Fair Trade food products totaled 60% of
the overall Fair Trade retail turnover within the EU. Co¤ee made up approximately 50% of the above-
mentioned share.
4Note that the gures refer to ground co¤ee, for instant co¤ee the shares are much lower FLO (2007).
5According to the FLO (2007), the worldwide certied sales of all Fair Trade products amounted to
roughly 2.3bln USD. The overall sum will be slightly higher given that the gure does not include non-
certied Fair Trade articles. Given this minor share, one could argue that the cross-price e¤ects impacting
the non-participating farmers are likely to be rather tame, if any. In Section 4 we argue that this might
not be the case.
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expansion of specialty markets and rising consumer awareness of the Fair Trade concept6
call for a closer evaluation of the respective pros and cons. We begin with developments on
the world co¤ee markets over the last few decades.
3.2.1 Co¤ee crisis in the 90s
Until 1989, the global co¤ee market was regulated through the International Co¤ee Agree-
ment (ICA), a set of agreements which stipulated production quotas and governed quality
standards for the majority of produced co¤ee. The disintegration of the ICA and the follow-
ing sharp rise in co¤ee supply coincided with stagnating demand and market concentration
of major roasting and trading companies. On the supply side, the quota abolition led to the
output expansion of existing producers (e.g., Brazil), as well as the entry of new signicant
players (Vietnam) specializing in the production of lower quality Robusta co¤ee. The de-
mand side, on the other hand, witnessed improved processing technologies that removed the
bitter taste of cheaper co¤ee beans such as Robusta and naturalArabica. These advances
shifted roastersdemand away from traditional co¤ee exporters from Central America spe-
cializing in a more expensive mild Arabica (see Lindsey, 2003).7 The co¤ee glut has been
further exacerbated by the long adjustment lags typical for co¤ee production.8
Except for short periods of recovery in the mid-90s, co¤ee prices reached historical lows
and led to substantial hardship in the a¤ected rural economies.9 In October 2001, the
price of higher quality Arabica co¤ee10 quoted at the New York Board of Trade reached its
lowest level in 30 years at 45 cents/lb. For the sake of comparison, Bacon (2005) puts the
estimated average monetary production costs of small farm producers to vary between 49
6Moore (2004) cites survey evidence on expanding shares of consumers describing themselves as ethical,
or strongly ethical.
7According to Wasserman (2002), cited in Lindsey (2003), the estimated percentage of mild Arabica in
the roastersleading co¤ee blends dropped from 50% in 1989 to 35% in 2001.
8 It takes several years before beans can be rst harvested.
9Bacon (2005) mentions substantial rural-urban migration in Matagalpa, Nicaragua and eroded farmlands
following the substitution from co¤ee to cattle pasture in Coto Brus, Costa Rica. Similar observations
from other regions can be found in e.g., Raynolds (2002a) or Ronchi (2002).
10Arabica and Robusta are the two main co¤ee species produced. While Arabica is grown mostly in Latin
America and Eastern Africa, major producers of Robusta co¤ee are located in Brazil, Uganda, India and
South-East Asian countries (ICO, 2007).
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and 79 cents/lb. Nonetheless, since 2001 the price of Arabica co¤ee has gradually risen so
that in October 2007 it has surpassed the Fair Trade minimum price 121 cents/lb.
3.2.2 Growth of specialty markets
While demand for normal bulkco¤ee has been stagnating and its prices have been falling,
the specialty co¤ee sector has been growing fast. For example, the U.S. gourmet co¤ee mar-
ket in 2001 represented 40% of the total market value and 17% by volume with annual
growth rates well above 5% (Giovanucci, 2001). The continuing success of specialty brands
has reected increasing consumer demand for high quality, taste and an attractive story
behind each cup of co¤ee. The Fair Trade and organic labels were able to keep up with these
market di¤erentiation trends and although they represent still a relatively minor share in the
specialty co¤ee sector (3-5% in the U.S. specialty co¤ee retail market Giovanucci (2001)),
their position becomes stronger year-by-year. Apart from increasing market shares in the
gourmet sector, the growing importance of Fair Trade in the co¤ee market becomes appar-
ent from both its increasing recognition by customers and widening presence in common
distribution channels. The former can be illustrated by survey evidence according to which
74% of the French population understood the notion of Fair Trade and 50% of the adult
population in the UK recognized the Fair Trade label (FINE, 2005). Fair Trade products
have also become increasingly available in mainstreamretail outlets. In Europe only, the
number of supermarkets with a Fair Trade selection increased from 43,100 in 1999 to 56,700
in 2004 (FINE, 2005), i.e., by 32%. The origins, organization and working of Fair Trade
networks facilitating the above-mentioned market progress is described in more detail in the
following section.
3.3 The origins, organization and benets of Fair Trade
The Fair Trade movement can be traced back more than 40 years when Alternative Trade
Organizations (ATO) established trade networks connecting marginalized producers in de-
veloping countries with socially aware customers in developed markets. In 1997 several inde-
pendent labelling initiatives formed Fairtrade Labelling Organization International (FLO).
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Five years later the FLO launched the FairTrade label in order to harmonize di¤erent labels
used at the time.
The organization currently works with 569 Fair Trade-certied producer organisations
representing over 1.4 million farmers and workers in 57 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin
America FLO (2007). Similar to other Fair Trade initiatives, the FLO supports Fair Trade
through the linking of producers with traders in order to match supply and demand, liai-
son with producer organizations to strengthen their production and export capacities, and
lobbying at international forums on trade and development. Nonetheless, the main task of
the FLO is the standard setting, certication and monitoring of the Fair Trade Certication
Trademark recipients.
3.3.1 Fair Trade and labelling
Of course, co¤ee is not the only Fair Trade article and not all Fair Trade products are
certied. According to FLO data, the retail value of all Fair Trade products sold in 14
European countries in 2005 totaled e657m at minimum, out of which e597m (i.e., approx-
imately 90%) came from the sales of certied products.The labelling scheme covers almost
exclusively food products. Besides co¤ee as a leading and most successful commodity, the
Fair Trade certication portfolio covers a number of other major crops including bananas,
cocoa and rice. The certication standards vary by commodity and production process
(small-scale farming vs. production by hired labor) and distinguish between producers and
traders.
In the case of co¤ee, traders have to trade directly with Fair Trade producers and:
1. pay at least a guaranteed minimum price (121 cents/lb for Arabica co¤ee) or above to
cover the costs of sustainable production. In case the co¤ee price quoted at the New
York Board of Trade exceeds the Fair Trade Minimum Price, the Fair Trade price
equals the New York price,
2. pay the Fair Trade premium 10 cents that should be used by producers for community
development or investment by individual producers,
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3. o¤er pre-nancing/liquidity up to 60% of the contract value,
4. sign contracts that promote long-term sustainable planning.
Fair Trade co¤ee producers, on the other hand, have to
1. be small-scale farmers associated in a democratic organization,
2. have the necessary export capacity,
3. pursue environmentally friendly production techniques FLO (2007).
The most visible Fair Trade benet to the participating farmers seems to be the Fair
Trade Minimum Price. Shocks and long adjustment lags of inelastic supply and demand in
the global co¤ee market directly translate into price uctuations, which can inict signicant
hardship on micro- and small-scale producers accounting for a signicant part of the overall
co¤ee production structure (see e.g., Raynolds, 2002a; Moore, 2004).11 These producers
face limited opportunities to cope with adverse market developments especially in periods
of prolonged low prices.
However, the availability of the minimum Fair Trade price during times of co¤ee gluts
and low market prices might result in excess supply that forces FT farmers to sell part of
their production via traditional channels. Depending on the relative prices and costs of
their production on FT and regular markets, it is possible that the excess supply regime
brings losses to some of the farmers. In Section 3.4, we develop a model that allows us to
study these e¤ects.
3.3.2 Other benets of Fair Trade
The minimum Fair Trade price is not the only benet to the participating farmers. The
interviewed farmers often mention the advantages of stability rather than the actual level
of the price.
11 In Central America, approximately 85% or 250,000 farms are micro- and small-scale (CEPAL, 2002 cited
in Bacon, 2005).
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An even more important dimension of Fair Trade, however, seems to be the access to
developed markets as well as the expert assistance from Fair Trade organizations aimed
to improve farmers position on the market. Fair Trade cooperatives often perceive the
scheme as an opportunity to learn about current demand trends and quality expectations
by customers. Relationships between the cooperatives and ATOs usually exceed the notion
of a common market transaction and can include joint investments or the development of
marketing strategies for the developed market. Raynolds (2002b, pp. 419) claims that
"in many cases the technical expertise and market information provided through
Fair Trade may be more important for producer associations than the nancial
and commodity arrangements. . . . This information is critical for those selling
their co¤ee via conventional channels or seeking organic specication."
In addition, many producers (Raynolds, 2002a; FLO, 2007; FTF, 2006) stated the elim-
ination of middlemen and farmersdirect Fair Trade experience markedly improved their
bargaining position with respect to other market agents and o¢ cial authorities.
3.4 Model
While the farmers narratives consistently report higher or at least stable incomes and
improved living conditions due to the guaranteed Fair Trade price, the question still remains
how the very existence of Fair Trade, the minimum price and other dimensions of the
scheme impact upon non-participating producers. Fair Trade has been sometimes called a
mechanism creating an excess supply of co¤ee, which ultimately hurts the non-participating
farmers through a lower equilibrium price on the global market (The Economist, 2006). In
this section we argue that regardless of the degree of competition on local co¤ee markets,
the introduction of a Fair Trade market per se leads to an improvement or at worst a
preservation of all farmersincomes unless the total realized demand for both types of co¤ee
decreases in a new equilibrium.12 In this respect, what many critics seem to address is
12The question how the demand for co¤ee changes when a FT market is introduced is primarily a question
about the consumerspreferences. Since we could argue both for an increase as well as a decrease of the
demand, we leave this question open.
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not the actual existence of a market with Fair Trade-certied products but the e¤ect of
a guaranteed rather than market-determined Fair Trade price. This, together with Fair
Trades impact on middlemens behavior and prots, is also a major focus of our study.
In this section we develop a model that allows for several transmission channels that
might impinge on both participating and non-participating farmers. The model addresses
the following questions: What is the impact of the introduction of Fair Trade markets on
farmersincomes? Does the guaranteed Fair Trade price disadvantage those producers who
do not engage in Fair Trade compared with those who do? How do the costs and benets
of the scheme depend on the structure of the markets?
For the sake of simplicity, we divide the exposition into two subsections. The opening
subsection assumes the absence of middlemen with monopsonistic positions vis-n{a}-vis the
farmers. The basic setup presents a world describing two coexisting, perfectly competitive
markets (one for conventional co¤ee, the other for Fair Trade co¤ee) supplied by farmers
from regions. We rst compare the two-market outcomes to the case with a single market
for normal co¤ee and then examine the impact of the Fair Trade price set above its market-
clearing level.
In the second part, we extend this framework by assuming market failure in the distri-
bution chain. In this setup, the middlemen control access to consumers, purchase normal
co¤ee from regional farmers and then deliver their product to the global market. Note
that while the world without middlemen described in the opening subsection is a useful
benchmark, it is not the existing structure of the co¤ee market. Our analysis thus allows
us to compare the impact of the Fair Trade mechanism in markets that do have powerful
middlemen with those that dont. It also allows us to predict what would happen if the role
of middlemen were somehow eliminated. Would FT continue to operate if middlemen were
absent?
3.4.1 Fair Trade in a world without middlemen
We assume there is a measure one of regions producing co¤ee and three types of economic
agents: farmers producing co¤ee, consumers and the Fair Trade Organization (FTO). The
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FTO sets up a new market and decides on the contracting price pF at which the exchange
will occur. The FTO does not engage in actual Fair Trade transactions and instead focuses
purely on the institutional support of Fair Trade exchange. Assume each farmer decides
between investment into the production of 1 unit of co¤ee or an outside option normalized to
zero.13 Given that the farmer opted for co¤ee production, she can sell the harvested co¤ee
on the world market with normal co¤ee and get p, or to the Fair Trade market at price pF .
In each region there is a measure one of farmers with heterogeneous production costs c and
compliance costs f .14 The production costs c follow a general distribution function with
c.d.f. G (c) dened over support h0; 1i. All farmers can also enter the Fair Trade market,
yet the cost of doing so for each farmer is f . We assume the following timing:15
1. The FTO sets up the FT market and sets the price pF .
2. Farmers choose between no production (outside option), production of regular co¤ee,
and production of certied FT co¤ee.
3. Production and trading take place.
The case for heterogeneity in production cost c is rather straightforward. Farmersedu-
cation, experience, family size, equipment and soil fertility generally di¤er, which translates
into corresponding di¤erences in farm cost levels.
The relationship between production costs c and compliance costs f is less clear and
derives directly from the nature of certication standards determined by the FLO. We ar-
gue that these costs are negatively correlated with farmersproductivity. To start with, the
13The normalization has been adopted for the sake of simplicity. While farmers might well face positive
and possibly heterogeneous outside options, these can be absorbed by the production cost parameter
c. The parameter would then have to be rescaled and reinterpreted as net investment costs into co¤ee
production.
14Given the absence of an intensive production margin, both types of farmerscosts are in principle xed.
We discuss their nature as well as the mutual relationship between c and f later in this section.
15We focus on subgame perfect equilibria, in which all players correctly expect those variables that are
determined later in the game. For example, farmers correctly expect the price of co¤ee on the world
market, p.
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farmers willing to produce and sell under the FLO label have to be organized into coopera-
tives, keep records of all income and expenses and follow a number of other FLO monitoring
guidelines. It seems quite reasonable to assume that the compliance with this kind of costs
will be easier for more productive farmers whose lead in productivity presumably links to
their superior management skills and expertise. The FLOs standards also include progress
requirements in terms of growth or volume, again favoring those with higher productivity.
Our emphasis on intangible skills such as know-how and management capacity rather than
production technologies in a traditional narrowsense likewise conforms to the anecdotal
evidence. For example, Raynolds (2002)b mentions the case of a Mexican cooperative that
succeeded in Fair Trade largely through its years of experience in conventional markets.
Similarly, Weber (2007) reports the di¢ culties of younger, less experienced producer or-
ganizations with entering the Fair Trade markets while Raynolds (2002)a emphasizes the
necessary strong leadership and capacity to innovate.
A fraction of compliance costs f can be attributed to the certication fees derived from
the FLOs certication scheme. These take the form of a at yearly fee paid to the FLO
to cover the costs of certication and expenses related to on-site inspections. Note that the
certication fee applies to the whole cooperative and thus introduces an incentive to expand
in order to reduce the per-capita certication cost. Since the incentives at the cooperative
level lie outside the primary focus of our paper, we abstract from this issue and assume the
per capita certication fee to be xed so that the positive correlation between production
costs c and overall compliance costs f will be preserved.
In addition to the positive correlation between the two types of costs, we assume that
the compliance costs are indivisible. That is, farmers cannot choose to incur only a part
of the compliance costs f , depending on the proportion of their harvest targeted to the
Fair Trade market. Given that the above-mentioned compliance costs relate largely to farm
attributes that are indivisible in nature, we believe our assumption to be a reasonable one.
As far as the other assumptions concerns, the introduction of multiple regions reects
the fact that co¤ee growing areas are typically spatially divided among private middlemen
taking a monopsonist or oligopsonist position with respect to local farmers. Arbitrage
among regions is in practice limited given the lack of information, poor infrastructure and
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natural barriers in mountainous areas where many small-scale co¤ee producers live (see e.g.
Ronchi, 2002).16 We also do not allow for production adjustment at the intensive margin
and instead assume a xed output per farmer. As Weber (2007) observes, FLO generally
does not induce a higher Fair Trade supply of presently participating farmers and instead re-
channels the existing production from conventional markets either through the certication
of additional applicants. Even if this was not the case, however, the situation of farmers
often does not permit a signicant expansion of output due to either the absence of key
productive assets such as land or capital, or the replacement of the former co¤ee growing
areas by urban development (Ronchi, 2002; Winters et al., 2004). This fact has also been
acknowledged by the European Fair Trade Association, which stated that "given the parcels
of land [the farmers] possess and the lack of working capital and resources, [the expansion
of output] is almost out of the question" (EFTA, 1998 cited in Ronchi, 2002). Despite the
suggestive evidence on its relatively low relevance for farmersadjustment, the model can
nonetheless allow for the intensive margin. The impact of price changes on the numbers of
active farmers would then be partly muted via the accommodation of farm output, yet the
middlemens incentives would remain the same, since the middleman is primarily interested
in the available quantity of co¤ee instead of the number of farmers.
The farmersconstraints
In our model, a farmer has three options. Given her expectations regarding the price of
regular co¤ee p, she can take an outside option of zero value (no production), or invest into
producing 1 unit of co¤ee. Given her decision to invest, she can sell to the market with
normal co¤ee or pay for the FT standards at an additional cost f and sell on the FT market.
16The normalization of the number of regions to 1 has been used for ease of exposition. Note that this does
not impact the results. The interested reader may simply multiply demand functions by 1
n
(where n stands
for the number of regions) and proceed with the analysis. Similarly, one might argue that the distribution
of the Fair Trade production across regions is not symmetric. Allowing for a fraction of regions to be
without Fair Trade production (yet with the same assumed cost structure) would impact on the relative
strength of individual channels at work. The qualitative picture, however, would not change. Finally,
one might argue that the cost structure is not identical across regions. In such a case, the model might
be given an alternative interpretation, where the overall cost distribution across internally homogeneous
regions follows c.d.f. G (c) and a single middleman with sole access to world markets decides on the overall
amount of purchases. The assumption of the middleman being a price taker on world markets, however,
would be rather di¢ cult to justify.
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The participation constraints are
no production: p < c & pF + (1  ) p  c < f
sell regular co¤ee: p  c &   pF   p < f
sell FT: pF + (1  ) p  c  f &   pF   p > f;
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the share of FT production that a farmer is able to sell his products
on the FT market, or equivalently, a probability of being able to sell all of the production
for a risk-neutral farmer. The case of  = 1 corresponds to the situation with both markets
clearing.
Rationing
If  < 1, the Fair Trade price pF is set above its market-clearing level. As a result, some
rationing of the sales of FT co¤ee has to take place.
The excess supply with  < 1 is a fairly justied assumption, both theoretically and
empirically. First, it is usual to see excess supply on a market in which the price is articially
increased above its equilibrium value. Empirical studies conrm this expectation. According
to Bacon (2005), close to 70% of Fair Trade cooperativesproduction goes to conventional
co¤ee markets and this gure is attributed to low demand and high quality requirements.
The Costa Rican cooperatives examined by Ronchi (2002) sold a mere 49% of their co¤ee
production as Fair Trade. In 2002, the FLO had to temporarily reject pending applicants
due to the discrepancy between supply and demand. In the same year the FLO estimated
that the supply of Fair Trade co¤ee was seven times the total Fair Trade volume actually
exported Weber (2007). While there are other possible explanations why FT farmers might
sell their co¤ee through conventional markets (e.g, liquidity problems during the harvest
season, see Bacon, 2005), in light of the above-mentioned evidence it seems that excess
supply plays an important role. In our model, the assumption of FT sales owing partially
through conventional channels relies fully on the excess supply argument.
We assume proportional rationing rule, ie. excess supply on the FT market makes the
participating farmers sell only part of their production through the Fair Trade channel,
the rest being directed back to markets with normal co¤ee. In the rational expectations
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equilibrium, the expectations will have to coincide with the realized proportion of the total
FT output sold to FT customers.
While proportional rationing seems a natural choice, it is not the only possibility and
di¤erent rules may a¤ect results signicantly. For example, if the rationing is done according
to the costs of FT production, only farmers with low costs will nd it optimal to apply for
FT certicate. This follows from rational expectations assumption: farmers with higher
costs that would be able to sell part of their production under the proportional rationing
rule but nothing under the rule based on the costs of production would prefer not to enter
in the rst place to save on the fee and additional production costs f . This would imply
that there would not be any rationing taking place, since only farmers that expect to be
able to sell on the FT market will enter it. The impact of an increase in FT price would
thus depend on the e¤ect it has on the quantity of co¤ee traded. We assume that this e¤ect
is negative, which would mean that if the FTO raises the FT price, it restricts the entry of
farmers. This does not need to happen under the rationing rule, because higher price on
FT market may attract more farmers despite a decrease in the probability of an successful
trade, as we show later in the numerical example. Since we do observe signicant excess
supply on the FT market, we prefer the proportional rationing rule.
We make another assumption that might inuence our results. We assume that con-
sumers do not care about the excess supply on the FT market. We are not aware of any
evidence that would suggest that consumers are aware of the existence of the excess supply
or that they change their behavior according to it. One might imagine that the consumers
increase their consumption of FT co¤ee in case of higher excess supply (due to potentially
more signicant warm glow e¤ect). It is also possible that they would decrease their
consumption, because they feel that the organization of FT market is wasteful and not ben-
ecial to the farmers. Since we use rather general demand functions, an explicit assumption
about the consumersreaction to excess supply would seem arbitrary. However, it might be
a potentially interesting venue for future research.
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Figure 3.1: Farmersdecisions for various cost combinations (f; c).
Production costs
The above-mentioned constraints dene the potential combinations of c and f (as well as the
corresponding cut-o¤ points) that are consistent with the particular participation choices
of the farmers. For simplicity, we will assume f = kc, where k  1 is a parameter.17 Figure
3.1 illustrates the participation constraints and the respective supplies for normal and FT
co¤ee generated by the line f = kc with k = 1 and c distributed uniformly over h0; 1i.
17Our specic assumption of the linear relationship between production costs c and compliance costs f
satises the assumption of a positive correlation between c and f and greatly simplies the subsequent
analysis. We might further allow for a part of compliance costs to reect the xed per-capita certication
fee discussed in this section, so that f = a + kc; a > 0. Nonetheless, the positive constant a does not
add much to our story (see the curve f = kc in Figure 3.1, which is in fact a special case of f = a + kc
with a = 0). Also note that independent of the production costs c and given the co¤ee prices p and pF ,
if k = 0 and f = a, all active farmers would be willing to participate either exclusively in the Fair Trade
or the normal market. The price mechanism would then have to adjust so that ultimately the farmers are
indi¤erent between the two choices. Hence some heterogeneity in f is needed for the model to become
interesting. For the purpose of the testing of our theory, one would need to estimate the value of the
parameter k from the costs that FT farmers have in addition to their similar non-FT counterparts. Such
estimation, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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Objective function of the Fair Trade Organization
The Fair Trade Organization is a non-prot institution that claims to aim to improve the
living conditions of farmers. It is not clear how this broadly dened motivation translates
into a decision about the Fair Trade price and other requirements. Thus, instead of making
an explicit assumption about the objective function of the FTO, we study how di¤erent
choices of the Fair Trade price impacts farmers (both participating and non-participating).
This allows us to discuss which objective of the FTO is consistent with its current behavior
and which is not.
Regardless of the objective function of the FTO, its role as a certication body is to
guarantee to the consumer that certain conditions (like price, pre-nancing, etc.) for the
farmers are met. In this respect, the FT certication works like any other certication sys-
tem. The certier, FTO, assures consumers about the properties of the good they purchase
that they cannot directly or easily observe. Thus, it solves the asymmetry of information
problem and facilitates the matching between farmers supply and consumer preferences.
The FTO, however, does not enter into direct transactions with either farmers or traders.
It is easy to nd examples of for-prot certication systems but it seems that the for-
prot behavior of the FTO would go directly against what it tries to sell. Thus, we focus on
possible non-prot objectives instead. It is also important to note that the quality that the
certier FTO provides is not the taste of the co¤ee and thus Fair Trade complements rather
then substitutes vertical di¤erentiation in this respect. Fair Trade certication, even though
it requires the sustainability of production processes, does not require that the products are
organic. In fact, one can often nd both organic and Fair Trade certication of the same
co¤ee.
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The equilibrium and comparative statics
We will assume that world demand for FT co¤ee DF
 
p; pF

depends on the prices of both
types of co¤ee and satises the following restrictions:18
DFp
 
p; pF

> 0; DFpF
 
p; pF

< 0 and
DFp  p; pF  < DFpF  p; pF 
A symmetric pattern is required to hold for normal co¤ee demand DN
 
p; pF

. These as-
sumptions impose reasonable restrictions the direct price e¤ect is negative and the indirect
price e¤ect is positive but smaller in absolute value than the direct e¤ect.
Note that given the minor share of Fair Trade in world co¤ee consumption (see Section
2), the cross-price e¤ects impacting upon the non-participating farmers could arguably be
rather tame (if there are any). In practice, however, even world demand di¤erentiates across
regions of origin. As a result, Fair Trade production in e.g. Nicaragua, where the share of
Fair Trade production is relatively high, might indeed a¤ect the prices of Nicaraguan co¤ee.
We assume that Fair Trade is strong enough to shift world prices.19
We are interested in an equilibrium with both markets being active.
If the price pF becomes market-determined, participation and realized supplies coincide
as farmers supply either to the normal or FT co¤ee market and  = 1. In the excess supply
setup with  < 1, however, we need to distinguish between the local participation choices
and the realized supplies to global markets.
18Several studies such as e.g., Broda and Weinstein (2006), Petrin (2002), or Feenstra (1994) addressed the
welfare impact of the introduction of new goods/markets within the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)s framework
that relies largely on CES utility functions and love-of-variety. In the present context of market creation
through environmental or socially conscious labelling, Podhorsky (2006) provides an extension of Melitz
(2003)s industry model with heterogeneous rms where each rm produces a di¤erent variety and decides
on the adoption of environmental label. For Fair Trade labelling, however, the goods in question are
typically ex ante homogeneous (such as locally fragmented co¤ee production before the introduction of
FT) and hence cannot be modelled as a di¤erentiated variety demanded by CES customers. By so doing,
it imposes product di¤erentiation among rms/farmers before the actual introduction of Fair Trade.
19 In the Appendix 3A we also provide a model extension in which we assume that the price of FT co¤ee
does not impact the demand for regular co¤ee.
82
[Participation in FT] : SF = G
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[Realized FT] : SWF = SF
[Realized N] : SWN = SN + (1  )SF ;
where N stands for normal/regular co¤ee marketand FT for "Fair Trade market". While
G

(pF p)
k

of the total population of farmers choose to participate in the FT scheme,
they are not able to sell exclusively to FT markets. Not being able to nd enough buyers,
their remaining harvest (1  )SF has to be sold through conventional channels.
In the rational expectations equilibrium, the realized supplies and demands have to be
equal.
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 
pF

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 
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
It is possible to show that there exists an equilibrium under standard conditions, using the
Implicit Function Theorem (IFT). The assumptions of the IFT require the existence of a
solution in one point, and non-singularity of the Jacobian of the equilibrium conditions. This
in fact imposes mild conditions on the supply and demand functions. The existence of an
equilibrium is not the prime focus of our paper and we thus do not provide a detailed proof.
A numerical example later shows that some equilibria indeed exist. Furthermore, in the
Appendix A3 we discuss informally the existence of equilibria in a model with middlemen.
Lemma 1 Under standard conditions on supply and demand functions, there exists an
equilibrium for a range of FT prices pF .
The following lemma shows that the presence of Fair Trade in our model benets all
farmers under quite general conditions.
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Lemma 2 Given that markets clear (i.e.,  = 1), the incomes of all farmers (weakly)
increase if and only if the total realized demand does not fall after the introduction of the
Fair Trade market.
Proof. If the overall realized demand in a new Fair Trade equilibrium remains constant,
it can exist only if the participating farmers are relatively better o¤ than selling through
the conventional channels. The normal farmerspayo¤s are furthermore unchanged due to
a constant price p.
If the overall realized demand in a new Fair Trade equilibrium increases, the non-
participating farmers have to be better o¤ since the actual increase only becomes possible if
the previously inactive farmers enter the production and this can only happen once the pur-
chase price of normal co¤ee p rises. Furthermore, the Fair Trade farmers are unambiguously
better o¤, otherwise they would not have been participating in the rst place.
If the total realized demand declines following the introduction of Fair Trade, the fall in
the consumption of conventional co¤ee has been less than compensated by the purchases of
Fair Trade co¤ee. As a result, normal farmers become worse o¤. Some FT farmers may be
better o¤.
In other words, unless total realized demand does not fall after the introduction of the
Fair Trade market, the very introduction of the scheme by the Fair Trade Organization
absent any price-setting constraints helps the participating farmers and at least does not
hurt the incomes and participation of normal co¤ee producers. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
case where the total realized demand has increased after the introduction of Fair Trade
despite a shift away from normal co¤ee. This happened due to a more-than-compensating
rise of Fair Trade consumption.
The present results are somewhat similar to the third degree price discrimination, where
the e¤ect of the discrimination depends on whether it decreases the output.20 As in the
literature on third degree price discrimination, we are also concerned here with the impact
of opening a new market. In addition to that, we study how xing the price on the newly
20We are grateful to Roland Strausz for suggesting this similarity.
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Figure 3.2: Shift away from normal co¤ee when Fair Trade is introduced (total demand
increases).
open market a¤ects the previous market. The rst question is thus similar to the question
in the literature on price discrimination, even though the decision to open the new market
is not done by the seller(s) on the old market and each consumer makes purchases on both
markets.
Our paper, due to the general structure of the demand side, does not allow us to study in
detail welfare e¤ects of opening a new market with FT co¤ee and setting above-equilibrium
price on it. For example, if opening the new market reduces the quantity traded on the
normal market, the e¤ect on farmers and consumers is heterogeneous. Some farmers (those
remaining on regular market) are worse o¤ because of the fall in price; those moving to the
FT market may be better o¤. Similarly for consumers. Increasing the price of FT co¤ee
may have positive e¤ects for some FT farmers and farmers on the regular market (due
to substitution e¤ects), but may hurt consumers. Unfortunately, deeper analysis of these
e¤ects is impossible without explicitly modelling demand side.
Assuming that the equilibrium exists, we are now interested in how it compares with the
market-clearing equilibrium at which there is no excess supply on the FT market ( = 1).
Lemma 3 If there are no middlemen, an increase in price pF above its market-clearing
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level increases the excess supply (1  ) and reduces the price of regular co¤ee p.
d
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
< 0:
All proofs are provided in the Appendix A3, unless noted otherwise.
Lemma 4 By increasing the price pF above its market-clearing level, the farmerspartici-
pation in the Fair Trade scheme increases if and only if"DNpF SWNSWF
 < "pF  and "DFpF  < "pF  :
The payo¤s of farmers participating in Fair Trade decrease unambiguously relative to the
market-clearing case.
The intuition behind both lemmas is quite straightforward. Holding other things con-
stant, if the Fair Trade Organization sets the contracting price pF above its market-clearing
level so as to maximize farmersparticipation in Fair Trade, the demand for Fair Trade has
to fall. Despite the concomitant rise of the demand for conventional co¤ee (we assume that
the indirect price e¤ect is weaker than the direct one), the excess supply of co¤ee remains
preserved and translates into corresponding pressure to reduce the price p. Furthermore, if
the demand elasticities are low vis-à-vis excess-supply elasticity "
pF
,21 the decrease in price
p becomes so pronounced that it makes the Fair Trade scheme more attractive and thus
increases participation. In such a situation the e¤ects of the minimum price pF resemble the
impact of the minimum wage in labor markets with heterogeneous oligopsonists (Manning,
2003). While the actual mechanism at work varies in each case, both results point to the
importance of agent heterogeneity in the modelling of market interventions. This result has
a simple corollary.
Corollary 5 In the excess-supply equilibrium with  < 1, the participation in the Fair
Trade scheme can increase relative to the market-clearing case with  = 1. This might
happen despite the fall of the participating farmerspayo¤s.
21The excess-supply elasticity "pF is dened as
pF

d
dpF
.
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Increasing the price pF above its market-clearing level hurts all farmers regardless of their
status, since both the price of the regular co¤ee p and the probability of being able to sell
Fair Trade  more than o¤sets the initial benet of a higher FT price pF . The previous result
holds even if participation in the Fair Trade scheme actually rises. The FT market becomes
relatively more attractive than the regular market, yet the FT payo¤s of the switching
farmers fall short of the normal-co¤ee payo¤s earned in the market-clearing equilibrium.
Had this not been the case, the switching farmers would have acted irrationally in the rst
place by having chosen normal co¤ee production in the market-clearing equilibrium.
Nonetheless, given the positive impact of the introduction of the Fair Trade market and
monotonically decreasing farmerspayo¤s, the FT farmers are still better o¤ as compared to
the setup with the non-existent Fair Trade market. To see this, note that if the Fair Trade
price pF were gradually raised up to the level prohibiting the existence of the Fair Trade
market, all farmers would supply to the normal market, thus imitating the equilibrium with
a single existing market for normal co¤ee.
In the following, we move away from the analysis of farmers individual payo¤s and
instead explore the impact of the excess-supply price pF both on the aggregated prots of
all farmers and on Fair Trade participants only. The aggregated prots serve as a proxy for
resources available for community investment.22
Lemma 6 In the excess-supply equilibrium with  < 1, the aggregated prots of all farmers
are decreasing.
The fact that the total prot of all farmers is decreasing in pF does not tell us whether
it is because the prots of both Fair Trade and regular farmers decrease, or because one
group benets in the aggregate while the other does not. The following lemma partially
answers this question. It formalizes the intuition that Fair Trade farmers cannot benet in
22The literature on Fair Trade lists a number of benets of Fair Trade that the present framework addresses
only indirectly or not at all (for a brief outline and references see the Appendix A3). One of the frequently
mentioned improvements concerns the pooling of resources for the production of positive externalities.
Ronchi (2002) reports the e¤orts of the Costa Rican cooperative COOPELDOS aimed at the maintenance
of local roads, other cooperatives provide a number of services such as extended credit or reforestation
support also to non-members. Strong rural linkages operating through large expenditure shares of local
non-tradeables (e.g., perishable and/or locally processed foods and services) have been emphasized in a
study by Winters et al. (2004).
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aggregate if their participation decreases as a result of an increase in price pF . Note that
the lemma actually strengthens this result by showing that even an increase in participation
may not be su¢ cient to guarantee an increase in their prots.
Lemma 7 If the participation of Fair Trade farmers decreases as a result of an increase in
pF , then the overall Fair Trade farmersprot decreases.
The observation is straightforward, since we already know that an increase in pF above
its market-clearing level lowers the prots of Fair Trade farmers.23 The only theoretical
possibility thus remains the case when the participation in Fair Trade increases. However,
such a condition is not su¢ cient given the simultaneous fall of Fair Trade farmersindividual
prots (see the Appendix A3). We will return to the possibility of increased overall Fair
Trade prots (driven by participation) in the following section with middlemen.
Summary of the results in the world without middlemen
In this section we focused on the e¤ect of the introduction of a Fair Trade market and a
binding minimum price pF in a setup without the presence of monopsonistic middlemen.
Our interim results assign a generally positive role to Fair Trade in that setting up a new
market might improve the matching of consumerspreferences with farmers supply. On
the other hand, the results conform to the critiques expressed e.g. in The Economist (2006)
or the Washington Post (2005), claiming that the excess supply caused by the binding
minimum price policy of the FLO tends to depress the incomes of the non-participating
farmers. This happens through the decline in the normal co¤ee price p, which in addition
forces some of the most disadvantaged to leave co¤ee production and seek outside options.
In this respect the Fair Trade scheme does not help farmers as much as it potentially could,
which also translates into prots at the aggregate level. Nonetheless, we assert that once
the new Fair Trade market per se boosts the farmers incomes, the excess-supply regime
still outperforms the initial situation with a single market for normal co¤ee.
23 In the absence of quantity adjustment at the farmers individual level, payo¤s and prots can be used
interchangeably.
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In the following section we allow for a specic kind of market failure on the normal co¤ee
market and incorporate monopsonistic middlemen restricting the access to world markets.
We will focus on the relationship between Fair Trade, farmersand middlemens incomes
and the behavior of the normal co¤ee price p.
3.4.2 Fair Trade in a world with middlemen
Previous sections have dealt with two interconnected markets absent any intermediaries.
The middlemen, however, play a signicant role in the overall distribution chain and their
allegedly exploitative position in fact stood at the very roots of the whole Fair Trade move-
ment (see previous sections). For these reasons we extend the model to allow for the presence
of intermediaries. These middlemen purchase co¤ee from local farmers and they have sole
access to world markets.
1. FTO sets price pF .
2. Middlemen set price pM .
3. Farmers choose between no production, regular co¤ee production and FT co¤ee pro-
duction.
4. Production and trade take place.
We assume that such a middleman is small with respect to global markets, yet she holds
some monopsony power vis-Our timing also requires that the middlemen can commit to
a given price and to buy any amount of co¤ee from farmers at that price. The second
restriction is not binding because in rational expectations equilibrium, middlemen correctly
expect the amount of co¤ee supplied by the farmers. Farmerschoices are identical to those
from the previous market-clearing case, yet now instead of the global market price p they
receive a price pM o¤ered by the middleman. We assume farmers have expectations about
the probability  of being able to sell their production on the FT market. The case  = 1
corresponds to no excess supply, while if  < 1 there is excess supply.
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The middlemans problem
Each middleman maximizes her prot so that
max
pM
(p  pM ) SN + (1  )SF 
s.t. SN = G(pM ) G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
SF = G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
;
which for a given  leads24 implicit solution for pM .
[pM ] :  [SN + (1  )SF ] + (p  pM )
 
g(pM ) +
2
k
g
 

 
pF   pM
k
!!
= 0 (3.2)
or alternatively,
(p  pM )
 
g(pM ) +
2
k
g
 

 
pF   pM
k
!!
= G(pM )  G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
: (3.3)
One can immediately observe that the middlemans optimal price pM is a function of
the success rate of Fair Trade farmers , the price of the Fair Trade co¤ee pF , and the
price p the middleman receives on the world market with conventional co¤ee. The following
lemma summarizes the relationship between the purchase price pM and the above-mentioned
variables.
Lemma 8 The middlemans optimal price pM is an increasing function of all its arguments,
i.e., @p
M
@ > 0;
@pM
@pF
> 0; and @p
M
@p > 0.
Proof. We provide an intuition for this statement; the formal proof is standard. An increase
in the success rate  or the Fair Trade price pF might make the middleman lose part of the
available farmerssupply. In response to this, the middleman partly compensates farmers
24Even though we normalize number of regions (n = 1) and thus also number of middlemen for technical
simplicity, the model is based on the assumption of large number of regions. For example, each middleman
does not take into account his impact on , because the excess supply on the FT market depends on the
behavior of other middlemen. If there would be only one middleman, he would be able to take  as
dependent on his price pM , signicantly complicating the model.
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by raising her purchase price pM . Similarly, a higher selling price p boosts the middlemans
revenues and allows further adjustment on the cost side.
More formally, the middleman sets the optimal price pM so as to equate the two expres-
sions. If , pF , or p increases, the marginal revenue loss for a given pM increases, while
the marginal cost savings fall or remain unchanged. Since the marginal gains in revenues
from additional normal co¤ee purchases exceed the corresponding marginal costs if pM is
relaxed, it is optimal25 for the middleman to raise the purchase price to pM 0 in order to
compensate for the improved outside options of the farmers (upward shifts in  and/or pF )
or to exploit favorable conditions on world markets (higher p).
One can also note that the middlemans optimal price setting means that any market
developments reected in price p translate only indirectly and typically in a less pronounced
way into farmersrevenues.26
The equilibrium and comparative statics
We start with an analysis of the equilibrium where the FTO decides on a price regime pF
when the middleman is present. If the participating farmers sell only part of their production
through the Fair Trade channel, the rest is sold to the middleman.
The farmers choices change to:
no production: pM < c &

pF + (1  )pM  c < f;
sell to middleman: pM  c &   pF   pM < f;
sell FT:

pF + (1  )pM  c  f &   pF   pM  f;
where pM is the middlemans optimal price, taking into account part of the Fair Trade
production that could not match Fair Trade markets. As before, we restrict our attention
25The second order condition implies that the slope of the marginal cost-savings function is steeper than
the slope of the marginal revenue loss function. As a result, the equality can be restored only at a higher
price pM .
26One can conjecture that in most cases @p
M
@p
< 1; but the proof depends on the behavior of the derivative
of density function g0: Thus, there might exist an equilibrium in which even @p
M
@p
> 1: For uniform
distribution, one can easily show that @p
M
@p
= 1
2
:
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to the case c = kf: Similar to the previous case when the middleman is not present, one
has to distinguish between farmerslocal participation choices and the realized supplies.
We have
[Participation in FT] : SF = G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
; (3.4)
[Participation in N] : SN = G(pM ) G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
;
[Realized FT] : SWF = SF ;
[Realized N] : SWN = SN + (1  )SF :
In a rational expectations equilibrium the realized supplies and the realized demands
are equal.
SWF = SF
 
; pM ; pF

= DF
 
p; pF

SWN = SN
 
; pM ; pF

+ (1  )SF  ; pM ; pF  = DN  p; pF  :
 = 
 
pF

; p = p
 
pF

; pM = pM
 
; p; pF

Lemma 9 Given that markets clear (i.e.,  = 1), all farmers are better-o¤ if and only if
the price pM o¤ered by the middlemen increases once the FT market opens. This happens
either if the downward adjustment of the world normal co¤ee price p stays relatively modest,
or if the price p actually increases in response to the new FT market.
The statement of the preceding lemma conforms to our results from Lemma 2 that dealt
with the world without middlemen. In fact, the present results are slightly stronger than
those from Lemma 2. The reason is that contrary to the case without middlemen, the
non-participating farmers now fare strictly better even if the price of normal co¤ee remains
unchanged. This happens as a consequence of the strategic behavior of the middleman,
who nds it protable to adjust her price pM slightly so as to mute the outow of farmers
towards Fair Trade. A direct consequence of the middlemans behavior is also that the
non-participating farmers can be better o¤ even if the normal co¤ee price p falls, given that
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the e¤ect of a decline in price p does not outweigh the positive e¤ect of Fair Trade farmers
improved access to world markets.
Moving to the comparative statics, we are now interested in how the price of normal
co¤ee p changes once the FTO sets price pF above its market-clearing level (i.e.,  < 1).
Lemma 10 Assume that @p
M
@ > 0 is small enough. In the presence of middlemen, an
increase in price pF above its market-clearing level increases the excess supply (1  ) and
might reduce or increase the price of regular co¤ee p.
Increasing pF above the market-clearing level might lead to four possible responses of p
and ,
dp
dpF
< 0; and
d
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
> 0; and
d
dpF
> 0;
dp
dpF
> 0; and
d
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
< 0; and
d
dpF
> 0:
The combination
dp
dpF
< 0; and
d
dpF
> 0
is not possible. Technically possible, yet very unlikely, is the case
dp
dpF
> 0; and
d
dpF
> 0:
First of all, an increase in  following the departure from market clearing is not a viable
option given that  = 1 and  2 h0; 1i. Secondly, while further away from the market-
clearing price pF such a constellation might still be permissible, this can happen only if one
is willing to accept dD
F (p;pF )
dpF
> 0.27 We do not nd such an adjustment setting plausible
and instead focus on the remaining options. Thus, there are only two interesting cases
where an increase in pF raises the excess supply
dp
dpF
< 0; and
d
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
> 0; and
d
dpF
< 0:
27The following lemma states that dp
M
dpF
< 0, which together with the present possibility that d
dpF
> 0
implies dS
F
dpF
> 0. But then the realized Fair Trade demand DF would have to be very sensitive to the price
pF and increase even more than Fair Trade supply SF in the new equilibrium in order to be consistent
with d
dpF
> 0.
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Note that the results from the previous lemma di¤er markedly from the setup with no
middlemen and contradict the statements by The Economist (2006) regarding the declining
normal co¤ee prices in the excess-supply regime. Given that an excess supply of Fair
Trade co¤ee is indeed able to inuence the prices of regular co¤ee, these can in principle
move in both directions. In particular, the arguments relying on the price mechanism
operating through world markets do not take into account the presence of market failure in
the distribution chain. The introduction of the Fair Trade channel mitigates the negative
impact of the middlemen restricting co¤ee supplies. The Fair Trade excess-supply regime,
on the other hand, returns part of the market power back to the middlemen, reintroduces
previous ine¢ ciency and in some cases might even lead to an actual increase in the prices
of regular co¤ee. Within the discussion of the excess-supplys impact on the incomes of
farmers, nonetheless, our results conform to The Economist (2006)s critique.
Lemma 11 In the excess-supply equilibrium with  < 1, the non-participating farmers are
unambiguously worse o¤ relative to the situation with the market-clearing Fair Trade scheme
( = 1). In other words, dp
M
dpF
< 0.
If dp
dpF
> 0, the overall demand falls unambiguously given our demand assumptions and
hence dp
M
dpF
< 0 in order to have a viable equilibrium. If dp
dpF
< 0, we show that it still holds
that dp
M
dpF
< 0, otherwise the monopsonist does not behave optimally.
Consider the situation of an increased price pF . Given that price pF rises and holding
price p constant, the demand for Fair Trade falls, so the part of production previously sold
as Fair Trade needs to be sold via middlemen to normal markets. Given pM and p and
regardless of farmersparticipation choices, the middlemen now face a higher supply from
farmers and can adjust optimally. Increasing pM given p would decrease their prots even
if one ignores the unexpected windfall coming from FT. The reason is that in such a case
the middlemen would not have been optimizing ex ante in the rst place. Taking into
account the windfall would make their decision even more unprotable at the margin. So
the middlemen will adjust by decreasing the purchase price pM .
Similarly to the setup without middlemen, we explore the impact of the excess-supply
price pF both on the aggregated prots of all farmers and on Fair Trade participants only.
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Lemma 12 If  < 1, d
dpF
< 0, and dp
M
dpF
< 0 in an equilibrium, then the revenue of all
farmers is decreasing in pF above its equilibrium value.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 5, if one substitutes pM in place of p:
The di¤erence between these cases comes from the di¤erence between prices p and pM : In
the case of a market with middlemen, price p is not directly relevant for the decision making
of a farmer, because he cannot trade at this price. Even though it might seem unlikely to
observe dp
M
dpF
< 0 in the case with middlemen or dp
dpF
< 0 without middlemen, our numerical
example (see Figures 3.33.5) shows that both cases are possible in general and the rst is
in fact prevalent. Intuitively, such an outcome happens because the probability of successful
trade  decreases enough to o¤set any favorable increase in price.
Lemma 13 If the participation of FT farmers decreases as pF increases, then the aggregate
FT farmersprots decrease.
Proof. Again, use pM instead of p to obtain the proof.
The preceding lemmas show that it is very unlikely that the aggregate prots of any
group of farmers would increase as a consequence of the excess supply Fair Trade regime.
Again, the only theoretical possibility remains an increase in the aggregate Fair Trade
prots. However, our numerical results produce falling aggregate prots regardless of the
participation patterns.28
The present setup with monopsonistic middlemen helped us understand the e¤ects of
the introduction of a new Fair Trade market and the negative impact of a minimum binding
price on both the normal farmersincomes and the aggregate prots. Nonetheless, we would
also like to analyze the relationship between the excess supply, the participation patterns
of both types of farmers, the income of Fair Trade farmers and prots of the middlemen.
Since the comparative statics with general demands and supply distributions proves to be
excessively complex, in the next subsection we illustrate a number of model outcomes on
an example with explicit functional forms.
28The same holds for the simulation results in the setup without middlemen.
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Example with explicit demands
In this subsection, we analyze the links between participation, incomes, middlemens prots
and the excess supply on a specic example with quasilinear demand preferences and uni-
form productivity distribution. We specify demand functions using a model of consumers
that considers normal and Fair Trade co¤ee to be imperfect substitutes. Lets assume a
quasilinear utility function
~U = U(xN ; xFT ) +Q
U(xN ; xF ) = 
 
xN + xF
  1
2
 
xN
2
+ 2xNxF +
 
xF
2
 2 h0; 1i; ;  > 0;
where xN and xF are consumptions of normal and FT, Q is the numeraire good. Note that
while Richardson and Stähler (2007) treat FT and normal products as perfect substitutes,
we take an alternative approach and model the Fair Trade good as an imperfect substitute
for normal co¤ee. In our framework, the degree of substitutability  is assumed to depend
negatively on the "warm glow" e¤ect discussed by Andreoni (1990), which in the present
context reects the additional utility due to the consumption of co¤ee grown under fair
standards. Note that higher  implies a lower warm glow e¤ect, i.e., regular and FT
co¤ee are easier to substitute.
Consumers maximize their utility given the budget constraint
pxN + pFxF +Q M:
The maximization problem leads to the demand function for normal and FT co¤ee,
respectively:
xN =

1 + 
+

1  2 p
F   1
1  2 p;
xF =

1 + 
+

1  2 p 
1
1  2 p
F :
Numerical results
In the following we plot three groups of graphs with our numerical results, each group
capturing a specic model dimension. For all graphs, the x-axis represents the excess of the
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Fair Trade price pF above its market equilibrium value. The results have been derived for
three di¤erent values of the substitution parameter , namely 0 (dot), 0:5 (circle) and 0:99
(x).
The rst group depicts the behavior of equilibrium prices p and pM and the proportion
of production going to Fair Trade . The graphs show that the proportion of production
sold on Fair Trade markets  decreases with the excess pF , but this e¤ect is smaller if  is
lower, i.e., when the two types of co¤ee are harder to substitute. In particular, lower  leads
to a relatively milder drop in the Fair Trade demand, hence the equilibrating adjustment of
 does not have to be as pronounced.
Consistent with Lemma 10, the graphs also show that the equilibrium price p on the
market for normal co¤ee can be both increasing and decreasing with pF , depending again
on the degree of substitutability. If both types of co¤ee are easier to substitute (higher ),
then the increase in price pF leads to a likewise increase in the price of normal co¤ee p.
The reason for the co-movement of prices pF and p is the congruent working of the
demand for normal co¤ee and the middlemans incentives to cut costs.29 Holding farmers
expectations regarding  and p constant, the initial rise in the Fair Trade price pF reduces
the Fair Trade demand. The released Fair Trade output has to be rechanneled back to the
middleman. With a higher degree of substitutability , this output volume becomes larger,
the middleman has a stronger incentive to lower the purchase price pM , and more of the least
productive farmers are thus pushed out of the normal co¤ee market. At the same time, the
cross-price reaction of the demand for normal co¤ee rises with  and further dampens the
extent of the potential co¤ee glut. As a result, for a su¢ ciently strong combination of the
middlemans price cutting and demand cross-price e¤ects the overall outcome might be a
higher normal co¤ee price p. Our numerical results in Figure 3.3 conform to the theoretical
possibility of a rising price p in the excess-supply regime.
We have already discussed the middlemens motivation to reduce the purchase price pM
in the excess-supply equilibrium (see Lemma 11). The last graph illustrates how the excess
supply of Fair Trade co¤ee strengthens the position of the middlemen relative to Fair Trade
29Remember that such a constellation would not be possible in the world without middlemen, since there
is no mechanism that would work against the downward pressure on the prices of conventional co¤ee.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium prices.
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with market clearing.30 As the middlemens prot margin increases with , one might even
observe a decline in the living standards of normal farmers and the least e¤ective farmers
leaving the market, despite a simultaneous increase in the world price of normal co¤ee p.
The second group of plots shows how prots depend on the excess of pF above its market
equilibrium value. Farmersaggregate prots are decreasing in the degree of substitutability
between normal and Fair Trade co¤ee. One can also see how the Fair Trade excess supply
30 In our discussion of the models adjustment mechanism, we assume that the middleman is not able to
distinguish between normal and Fair Trade farmers so that she o¤ers the same price pM to both groups.
In other words, the middleman is not able to discriminate between the two types of producers. The
middlemans ability to ration depending on the producer type would lead to the optimal response pM
being set to zero for unsold Fair Trade production, which would in turn lower the Fair Trade farmers
expected payo¤s as well as their participation in the scheme. The remaining participating farmers would
then de facto play an innite lottery with the probability  of winning pF  c f and the probability 1 
of making a loss   (c+ f). While we did not nd any empirical evidence on middlemens discrimination
based on farmers status, the main reason for our non-rationing assumption is that the lottery setup
represents a rather special sub-case of the present model with no signicant changes in results.
Of course, by decreasing pM , the middleman forgoes some farmers on the produce/stay inactive margin,
yet this amount depends on  only indirectly through the middlemans reaction to the released Fair Trade
output.
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium prots.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium quantities.
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regime benets the middlemen and how the increasing level of  boosts their prots. The
closer substitutes both kinds of co¤ee are, the faster the middlemens prots rise both at
the intensive (p  pM ) and the extensive (SWN ) margin.
Finally, we plot graphs that describe farmersparticipation choices and realized supplies
as functions of the excess-supply price pF . The farmersparticipation choices are described
in plots labelled normal supply and FT supply. The reader will notice that the par-
ticipation in the Fair Trade scheme initially rises yet eventually decreases as the di¤erence
between FT price pF and market-clearing price increases. At these levels, the Fair Trade
participation declines sharply as many previously Fair Trade farmers now switch back to the
normal co¤ee production. Given that the middlemens purchase price pM falls continuously,
it is precisely this group of farmers that drive the postponed increase of the normal co¤ee
supply.
The participation choices di¤er from the pattern of realized trades, since part of the Fair
Trade harvest has to be sold through conventional markets. The plots labeled Realized
FT trades and Middlemen output capture the actual volumes of trade transacted on
each market. These plots again conrm that the greatest benefactor from the excess-supply
regime are in fact not the farmers, but paradoxically the middlemen.
Summary of the results in the world with middlemen
In this section we focused on the e¤ect of the introduction of the Fair Trade market and
binding minimum price pF in a setup with monopsonistic middlemen. Our results conform
to the generally positive role for Fair Trade discussed in the previous section. Furthermore,
they convey a number of additional conclusions that either complement or replace the non
middlemen setup.
First of all, the common claims that the excess supply caused by the binding minimum
price policy of the FLO tends to depress world prices and thus the incomes of the non-
participating farmers are not quite precise. The normal co¤ee price p might in fact increase
due to the market failure in the distribution chain - the middlemen. Nonetheless, the im-
pact on the non-participating farmersincomes remains negative. The reason is that in the
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present setup there exist two channels through which Fair Trade a¤ects the incomes of farm-
ers. In comparison with the world without middlemen, the rst channel has strengthened
in that the Fair Trade market boosts incomes not only through the improved matching of
farmersoutput with di¤erentiated demand, but also by dampening the market power of
the middlemen. The second channel, i.e. the negative impact of the minimum price pF , has
however likewise became stronger. The minimum contracting price policy now returns part
of the market power back to the middlemen, who in fact become the greatest benefactors
of this regime relative to the Fair Trade market with exible price.
3.5 Conclusion
The recent success story of Fair Trade has provoked a lively debate on the scope and intensity
of the schemes actual benets and shortcomings. We develop a simple framework and nd
that the introduction of a new Fair Trade market has the capacity to improve the living
conditions of all farmers. The schemes potential is not fully met, however, as the FTOs
supplementary policy of a minimum contracting price brings about costs in terms of the
lower-than-possible payo¤s of the majority of farmers, the higher-than-necessary exit of
the non-participating farmers from the co¤ee production, and less resources for community
investment. The above equilibrium Fair Trade price can be justied merely as a policy of
increasing farmersparticipation within the Fair Trade scheme.
The major beneciary of the minimum price policy are paradoxically the middlemen
whose allegedly exploitative position stood at the very roots of the whole Fair Trade move-
ment. In our numerical example we show that the middlemen use their monopsony position
to appropriate part of the farmerspayo¤s that would have been realized under the market-
clearing setup. The excess supply thus allows the middlemen to exploit the farmers more
than they could in the case of market clearing on the Fair Trade market. The protabil-
ity of the excess-supply regime for the middlemen also raises with the substitutability (as
measured by ) between normal and Fair Trade co¤ee. For a high degree of substitutability,
one might even observe an increase in the world price of normal co¤ee p and a simultaneous
decline in the living standards of normal farmers.
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Our paper does not focus on certain aspects of Fair Trade, including the impact on
migration and the local environment, self-governance, credibility or the nation-wide real-
location of resources. By no means do we claim that these concerns are of lesser or no
importance. Nonetheless, given the absence of an integrated modelling approach, we focus
on a specic area of interest and analyze it within a well-dened framework. This area
relates to the distributional impact of the Fair Trade scheme.
The models results should serve as a comment on the potential risks and limitations of
the otherwise relatively successful Fair Trade scheme. It seems quite reasonable that the very
existence of Fair Trade alleviates the informational asymmetry between socially-conscious
Western consumers, distributors and farmers located in developing countries. Given that
consumers value fairproduction, the absence of credible information and non-negligible
xed costs related to setting up markets hinders the functioning of the Fair Trade market
and some sort of market intervention thus might be justied. Nonetheless, the schemes
optimal design remains an open question and we hope to provide at least a partial answer.
From the policy perspective, we agree that the guaranteed minimal pF can take a num-
ber of other important roles such as insurance against volatile co¤ee prices or an improved
outside option for the farmers participating in sharecropping agreements. Our results should
rather be understood as a selective contribution to the debate on the benets of alterna-
tive policy instruments. For example, the stability of Fair Trade prices can be achieved
through other instruments than a xed minimum price. The related problem of the excess
supply on Fair Trade markets can be addressed e.g., through the introduction of a pre-
determined schedule and gradual replacement of established Fair Trade producers by their
less experienced counterparts.
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3.6 Appendix A3
3.6.1 Model without middlemen
Comparative statics Proof of Lemma 3. To show that
d
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
< 0
take the total derivatives of the market equilibrium conditions and rearrange them to obtain 
SF + SF
 d
dpF
+
 
SFp  DFp
 dp
dpF
= DFpF   SFpF
SWN
d
dpF
+
 
SWNp  DNp
 dp
dpF
= DNpF   SWNpF
SF = G
 

 
pF   p
SN = G(p) G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
SWF = SF = G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
SWN = G(p)  G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
;
where
t =

 
pF   p
k
SF = g(t)
pF   p
k
; SFp =  g(t)

k
; SFpF = g(t)

k
SWN =  

g(t)
pF   p
k

  SF
SWNp = g(p) + (g(t))

k
SWNpF =  g(t)

k
:
Substituting for supply relationships and expressed in a convenient matrix form we obtain:
24 SF + g(t)pF pk  g(t)2k ) +DFp 
 g(t)pF pk   SF g(p) + (g(t))k  DNp
3524 ddpF
dp
dpF
35=
24 DFpF   g(t)2k
DN
pF
+ g(t)
2
k
35 :
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Note that the signs of the individual cells are unambiguous:24 +  
  +
3524 ddpF
dp
dpF
35=
24  
+
35 :
Rearranging comparative statics one gets
d
dpF
=
DF
pF
  g(t)2k
SF + g(t)p
F p
k
+

g(t)
2
k ) +D
F
p

SF + g(t)p
F p
k
dp
dpF
(3.5)
d
dpF
=  
DN
pF
+ g(t)
2
k
SF + g(t)p
F p
k
  g(p) + (g(t))

k  DNp
SF + g(t)p
F p
k
dp
dpF
: (3.6)
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) give us comparative statics in the FT market with the equilibrium
values of d
dpF
and dp
dpF
. Of course, in the overall equilibrium both equations have to be
satised simultaneously, which allows us to compute both d
dpF
and dp
dpF
:
Given our demand assumptions, a closer look at the system tells us that
DF
pF
  g(t)2k
SF + g(t)p
F p
k
<  
DN
pF
+ g(t)
2
k
SF + g(t)p
F p
k
and
0 <

g(t)
2
k ) +D
F
p

SF + g(t)p
F p
k
<  g(p) + (g(t))

k  DNp
SF + g(t)p
F p
k
;
because we assume that the direct price e¤ect is stronger than the indirect one: jDF
pF
j > DN
pF
;
jDNp j > DFp : This implies that the solution has to satisfy ddpF < 0, dpdpF < 0. This is easy to
see - while both relationships are not linear, the intercept of (3.5) is unambiguously lower
than the intercept of (3.6), while the slope of (3.5) is positive yet not as steep as that of
(3.6). This implies that both curves (given that they exist and are continuous, which we
assume) can cross only in the 3rd quadrant,31 or in other words
d
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
< 0:
31 Alternatively, one can express dp
dpF
from (3.5) and (3.6) to see that the sign has to be negative:
dp
dpF
=  
DF
pF
 2=k
2SF
+
DN
pF
+2=k
2SF
DNp  (1+2)=k
2SF
+
(2=k+DFp )
2SF
< 0:
Once this is established, one can infer that d
dpF
< 0 from (3.5).
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The impact of Fair Trade on farmerspayo¤s and participation Proof of Lemma
4. 1) In the excess-supply equilibrium, the farmersparticipation in the Fair Trade scheme
increases if and only if "DFpF  < "pF  and "DNpF SWNSWF
 < "pF  .
The payo¤s of farmers participating in Fair Trade decrease unambiguously relative to
the market-clearing case.
 We are interested in the sign of dS
F (;p;pF )
dpF
, where SF
 
; p; pF

corresponds to par-
ticipation in the Fair Trade certication scheme.
In the excess-supply equilibrium with  < 1 it has to hold that
SF
 
; p; pF

= DF
 
p; pF

SN
 
; p; pF

+ (1  )SF  ; p; pF  = DN  p; pF  ;
 = 
 
pF

; p = p
 
pF

:
Consider an increase of pF above its equilibrium value. In the new equilibrium, the
realized FT supply SF has to match the FT demand DF , hence it has to hold that
d

SF
 
; p; pF

dpF
=
dDF
dpF
SF
 
; p; pF
 d
dpF
+ 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
=
dDF
dpF
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
=
1


dDF
dpF
  SF  ; p; pF  d
dpF

sign
 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
!
= sign

dDF
dpF
  SF  ; p; pF  d
dpF

sign
 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
!
= sign

dDF
dpF
  D
F

d
dpF

:
Pre-multiplying the term in the brackets by p
F
DF
> 0, one gets
sign
 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
!
= sign

pF
DF
dDF
dpF
  p
F

d
dpF

= sign

"D
F
pF   "pF

:
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Finally, since d
dpF
and dD
F
dpF
are both negative, we have
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
> 0 ()
"DFpF  < "pF  :
 For the second part of Lemma 4 we use the fact that
SF = G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
SWN = SN + (1  )SF = G(p)  G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
;
hence
sign
 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
!
= sign
 
pF   p d
dpF
+ 

1  dp
dpF

:
Take the total derivative of the normal co¤ee market equilibrium condition 3.1,
d

SWN
 
; p; pF

dpF
=
dDN
dpF
d

G (p)  G

(pF p)
k

dpF
=
dDN
dpF
1
k
 
pF   p d
dpF
+ 

1  dp
dpF

=  

DNp
dp
dpF
+DN
pF

g

(pF p)
k
 + g(p)
g

(pF p)
k
 dp
dpF
 
 
G

(pF p)
k

g

(pF p)
k
 d
dpF
;
which implies
sign
 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
!
= sign
264  

DN
pF
+G

(pF p)
k

d
dpF

+ 
g(p) DNp
 dp
dpF
375 :
Knowing that dp
dpF
< 0, multiply the term in the brackets by p
F
 > 0 and
G (p)  G

(pF p)
k

G (p)  G

(pF p)
k
 = 1
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to obtain
sign
 
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
!
= sign
26664
( 1)

"D
N
pF
SWN
SWF
+ "
pF

+ 
g(p) DNp
 dp
dpF
pF
| {z }
<0
37775 :
That is,
dSF
 
; p; pF

dpF
> 0 ()
"DNpF SWNSWF
 < "pF  :
2) In the excess-supply equilibrium without middlemen, the Fair Trade farmerspayo¤s
decrease unambiguously.
To show that the participating farmerspayo¤s decrease unambiguously, note that
d
dpF
<
DF
pF
G

(pF p)
k

implies dp
dpF
< 0, so for more negative values of d
dpF
the change in farmers revenues from
FT becomes less and less favorable. In other words,
d
dpF
=
DF
pF
G

(pF p)
k

represents the marginal value of d
dpF
consistent with transition to a new equilibrium. Now
d
dpF
=
DF
pF
G

(pF p)
k
 ! dp
dpF
= 0
and we have
d
dpF

pF + (1  ) p
k

=
1
k
2664 +  pF   p ddpF| {z }
<0
+ (1  ) dp
dpF| {z }
<0
3775 =
=
1
k
2664 +  pF   p ddpF| {z }
<0
3775 : (3.7)
But we also know that for d
dpF
=
DF
pF
G

(pF p)
k

 
pF   p d
dpF
=  
kDF
pF
g

(pF p)
k
 + k
g

(pF p)
k
 dDF
dpF
  ;
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so that
d
dpF

pF + (1  ) p
k

=
1
k
2664 +  pF   p ddpF| {z }
<0
+ (1  ) dp
dpF| {z }
<0
3775 = (3.8)
1
g

(pF p)
k
  DFpF + dDFdpF

=
1
g

(pF p)
k
 DFp dpdpF

= 0; (3.9)
which is the best possible impact on the Fair Trade farmerspayo¤s that is consistent with
the excess-supply equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 1. Following the rise of the Fair Trade price, the participation in the
Fair Trade scheme can increase despite the fall of the participating farmerspayo¤s.
The total derivative of the Fair Trade participation equals
dG

(pF p)
k

dpF
= g
 

 
pF   p
k
!
| {z }
>0
"
d
dpF
 

 
pF   p
k
!#
=
=
1
k
g
 

 
pF   p
k
!"
d
 
pF + (1  ) p
dpF
  dp
dpF
#
;
where
g (x) =
dG(x)
d(x)
:
Hence the sign of the total derivative depends on the sign of the part in square brackets.
Even if the Fair Trade payo¤s decline after the move from  = 1, i.e.,
d
 
pF + (1  ) p
dpF
< 0;
the bracketed term can be positive since   dp
dpF
> 0.
3.6.2 Model with middlemen
Existence of equilibria with middlemen In order to proceed with the analysis, we
will assume that there exists an equilibrium in which both markets are active, and which
generates market-clearing prices p and pF , i.e. an equilibrium in which  = 1. This section
informally discusses under which conditions the equilibrium will exist. We do not claim
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that these conditions are necessary, as the existence of the equilibrium is not of our primary
interest. In particular, we discuss the price ranges for which one may hope to nd an
equilibrium.
The market-clearing conditions are
FT market : DF
 
p; pF

= G(
 
pF   pM =k) = SF  pF ; pM  p; pF 
Normal market : DN
 
p; pF

= SN
 
pF ; pM
 
p; pF

= G(pM ) G( pF   pM =k):
Obviously, we may have equilibrium only if
0  SF  1; 0  SN  1; SF + SN  1:
We will be interested in those equilibria in which both markets are active. In case of a
uniform distribution G(x) = x; g(x) = 1, we can discuss a range of prices for which there
might be an equilibrium.
0 < SF ; 0 < SN ; SF + SN  1:
The last constraint can be expressed in the form
p
2
+
pF
2 (k + 1)
 1:
The other two constraints are
(2k + 1)pF   p(1 + k) > 0; p+ kp  pF > 0:
The possible combination of prices p; pF is the triangle on the following picture.
We can see that if k decreases, which means that it is relatively cheaper for all farmers to
produce FT co¤ee, the set of prices that might correspond to an equilibrium shrinks. This
is an intuitive result - for very low k; it is cheap to obtain an FT certicate and thus prices
on the regular market (p) must be close to the FT prices (pF ) in the market equilibrium.
Note that this result holds in the excess supply equilibrium with appropriate modications
to the picture (pF has to be replaced with pF on the supply side). The expected value
from participation in the FT and regular markets must be similar if the participation costs
in the FT market are low.
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Figure A3.1: Participation constraints depending on p; pF for k = 1 (full line) and k = 0:5
(dashed line) .
The impact of Fair Trade on farmerspayo¤s and participation with the middle-
men Proof of Lemma 9. All farmers are better o¤ if and only if the price pM o¤ered
by the middlemen increases once the FT market opens. This happens if the overall demand
for co¤ee does not fall substantially, i.e., if the world price of normal co¤ee p is relatively
insensitive to the price of FT co¤ee pF ; or if it actually increases as a result of the new FT
market. It is easy to observe that compared to the situation without Fair Trade, all farmers
benet only if the price of co¤ee set by middleman pM increases and such increases indeed
attract new farmers. If the price pM decreases, some FT farmers might be better o¤ than
before, but there is a group of farmers who stop selling co¤ee altogether. These farmers
lose, since in the absence of FT they used to make small yet positive prots. In general,
the middlemans price pM might move both ways, because the movement of the price p is
ambiguous and might dominate the other e¤ects working through the Fair Trade price pF
or the success rate . Nonetheless, it is easy to show that for xed p, price pM 0 in the world
with an active FT market is larger than pM when an FT market does not exist. To see this,
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compare the rst order conditions of the middleman:
[no FT] :
 
p  pM g(pM ) G(pM ) = 0
[FT] :
 
p0   pM 0 g(pM 0) + 1
k
g

pF 0   pM 0
k

 
G(pM 0) G

pF 0   pM 0
k

= 0:
It is obvious that once we plug in the values of pM and p from the rst line, the last
element on the second line, G(pM )   G

pF pM
k

, is smaller than G(pM ). Also, trivially
1
kg

pF pM
k

> 0: Thus, if we plug in pM from the rst FOC into the second one and
evaluate the sign, we see that
 
p  pM g(pM ) G(pM ) +  p  pM 1
k
g

pF   pM
k

+G

pF   pM
k

> 0 (3.10)
or alternatively,
 
p  pM g(pM ) + 1
k
g

pF   pM
k

>

G(pM ) G

pF   pM
k

:
Since the marginal gains in revenues from additional normal co¤ee purchases exceed the
corresponding marginal costs for pM from the world without Fair Trade, it is optimal for the
middleman to raise the purchase price to pM 0: Thus the inequality implies that pM 0 > pM .
This argument requires that the rst order condition of the FT market middleman is
monotonic (unique local maximum) and that p is xed. If the world price p is not very
sensitive to the introduction of FT co¤ee (e.g., the FT market is small), then the argument
holds by continuity (expression (3.10) remains positive for small changes in p). It is obvious
to see that if p actually increases, then the argument holds as well, so the only case when
it might not hold is when p decreases signicantly as a result of the FT market opening.
However, this can only happen once the overall world demand declines sharply after the
introduction of Fair Trade, which is consistent with our results from Lemma 2 that dealt
with the world without the middlemen. In fact, the results for the market-clearing case
with the middlemen are slightly stronger than those in Lemma 2. In the world with the
middlemen, the non-participating farmers are better o¤ even if the price of the normal co¤ee
does not change. This happens as a consequence of the strategic behavior of the middleman,
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who nds it protable to adjust her price pM slightly in order to mute the outow of farmers
towards Fair Trade. Hence the non-participating farmers can fare better despite the possible
fall of the normal co¤ee price p, given that the decline is not too sharp.
Comparative statics in the world with middlemen Proof of Lemma 10. Again,
similarly to the excess supply analysis without the middlemen we di¤erentiate the whole
system (3.4):
SF
d
dpF
+ 

SF
d
dpF
+ SFpM

@pM
@pF
+
@pM
@
d
dpF
+
@pM
@p
dp
dpF

+ SFpF

=
DFp
dp
dpF
+DFpF
SWN
d
dpF
+ SWNpM

@pM
@pF
+
@pM
@
d
dpF
+
@pM
@p
dp
dpF

+ SWNpF =
DNp
dp
dpF
+DNpF ;
where SWN is a partial derivative of S
WN with respect to ; for example.
Rearranging, one gets
SF + SF + 
@pM
@
SFpM

d
dpF
+

SFp + 
@pM
@p
SFpM  DFp

dp
dpF
=
= DFpF   SFpF   SFpM
@pM
@pF
(3.11)
SWN + S
WN
pM
@pM
@

d
dpF
+

SWNp  DNp + SWNpM
@pM
@p

dp
dpF
= DNpF   SWNpF  
@pM
@pF
SWNpM : (3.12)
We can plug in for SF ; SN ; SF ; SWF ; SWN and their derivatives:
SF = G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
SN = G(p) G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
SWF = SF = G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
SWN = G(pM )  G
 

 
pF   pM
k
!
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SF + 
@pM
@
SFpM = g(t)

pF   pM
k
  
k
@pM
@

SFp + 
@pM
@p
SFpM =  g(t)
2
k
@pM
@p
;
SFpF + S
F
pM
@pM
@pF
= g(t)

k
  
2
k
g(t)
@pM
@pF
;
SWN + S
WN
pM
@pM
@
= g(pM )
@pM
@
  g(t)

pF   pM
k
  
k
@pM
@

  SF
SWNp + S
WN
pM
@pM
@p
=

g(pM ) + g(t)

k
 @pM
@p
SWNpF +
@pM
@pF
SWNpM =

g(pM ) + g(t)

k
 @pM
@pF
  g(t)
k
t =

 
pF   pM
k
:
We can rewrite the equations (3.11) into matrix form24 SF + g(t)pF pMk   k @pM@   g(t)2k @pM@p  DFp
g(pM )@p
M
@   g(t)

pF pM
k   k @p
M
@

  SF  g(pM ) + g(t)k  @pM@p  DNp
3524 ddpF
dp
dpF
35=
24 DFpF   g(t)2k
DN
pF
   g(pM ) + g(t)k  @pM@pF + g(t)k
35 :
Note that the signs of the individual cells depend on the size of @p
M
@24 +  
  +
3524 ddpF
dp
dpF
35=
24  
+
35
SF + g(t)

pF   pM
k
  
k
@pM
@

> 0
 g(t)
2
k
@pM
@p
 DFp < 0
g(pM )
@pM
@
  g(t)

pF   pM
k
  
k
@pM
@

  SF < 0
g(pM ) + g(t)

k
 @pM
@p
 DNp > 0:
From Lemma 9, we know that @p
M
@ > 0, so we need
@pM
@ to be small for this result to hold.
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For notational simplicity, we will write24 A B
C D
3524 ddpF
dp
dpF
35=
24 E
F
35 :
To show that
dp
dpF
< 0 and
d
dpF
> 0
is not possible, we need to show that if d
dpF
> 0; then dp
dpF
> 0: To do this, we write
A
d
dpF
+B
dp
dpF
= E
C
d
dpF
+D
dp
dpF
= F:
We know that A > 0 > C;D > 0 > B;F > 0 > E: So if d
dpF
> 0; A > 0; but E < 0; it must
be that B dp
dpF
< 0 in equilibrium, which means, because B < 0; that dp
dpF
> 0. The same
argument holds for the second equation: F > 0; the rst element (C d
dpF
< 0) is negative, so
the second element on the second line must be positive. Since D > 0, it implies dp
dpF
> 0: So
the previous results about the impossibility of d
dpF
> 0 and dp
dpF
> 0 seem to be preserved.
Thus, we have the following combinations that are of theoretical interest:
dp
dpF
< 0; and
d
dpF
< 0
dp
dpF
> 0; and
d
dpF
< 0:
Other possibilities are either not interesting or impossible:
dp
dpF
> 0 and
d
dpF
> 0 (not interesting)
dp
dpF
< 0; and
d
dpF
> 0 (not possible):
So one can see that an increase in FT price pF leads to an increased excess supply, but the
impact on the world price is ambiguous p.32
32Note that the e¤ect on the world price, even if theoretically predicted, is likely to be extremely small
given the relative sizes of both markets. Thus, the result is more of a theoretical interest than a testable
prediction.
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3.6.3 Aggregate farmersprots
Proof of Lemma 5. Unless the world price of co¤ee p increases signicantly when the
price of FT co¤ee increases, the aggregated prot of all farmers is decreasing in pF above
the market equilibrium.
Revenues of the farmers in the excess-supply regime without middlemen is
R = SWNp+ SWF pF = (SN + SF )p+ SF (pF   p);
SF = G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
SN = G(p) G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
R = G(pM )p+ G
 

 
pF   p
k
!
(pF   p):
The costs are slightly more complicated:
C =
Z t
0
(k + 1)cg(c)dc+
Z p
t
cg(c)dc
C =
Z pM
0
cg(c)dc+ k
Z t
0
cg(c)dc;
t =

 
pF   p
k
:
These costs change with the change in pF in the following way:
dC
dpF
= pg(p)
dp
dpF
+ ktg(t)

k
(1  dp
dpF
) + ktg(t)
pF   p
k
d
dpF
;
= pg(p)
dp
dpF
+ ktg(t)

d
dpF
pF   p
k
+

k

1  dp
dpF

:
The change in revenues is
dR
dpF
=
dp
dpF
(G(p) + pg(p)) +
d
dpF
G(t)(pF   p)+
(pF   p)g(t) dt
dpF
+ G(t)

1  dp
dpF

;
dt
dpF
=
d
dpF
 
pF   p =k + 
k

1  dp
dpF

:
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Note that
dR
dpF
  dC
dpF
=
dp
dpF
 
G(p)  G
 

 
pF   p
k
!!
+
d
dpF
 
G(t)(pF   p) :
Since   1 and (p
F p)
k  p in an equilibrium, the outcome depends on the sign of dpdpF
and d
dpF
: We have already shown that d
dpF
< 0 in any relevant equilibrium. Thus, unless
dp
dpF
> 0 and is large enough, the prot of all farmers is decreasing in pF above the market
equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 6. If the participation of FT farmers decreases as a result of an increase
in pF , then the overall FT farmersprot decreases.
The revenue and costs of FT farmers:
R = G(t)(pF + (1  )p) = G(t)(kt+ p)
C =
Z t
0
(k + 1)cg(c)dc:
We can compute the derivatives:
dR
dpF
= g(t)(kt+ p)
dt
dpF
+G(t)

k
dt
dpF
+
dp
dpF

dC
dpF
= (k + 1)tg(t)
dt
dpF
;
dt
dpF
=
d
dpF
 
pF   p =k + 
k

1  dp
dpF

:
The di¤erence is
dR
dpF
  dC
dpF
= g(t)(kt+ p)
dt
dpF
+G(t)

k
dt
dpF
+
dp
dpF

  (k + 1)tg(t) dt
dpF
=
dt
dpF
g(t)

p  p
F   p
k
+ kG(t)

+G(t)
dp
dpF
: (3.13)
Note that
g(t)

p  p
F   p
k
+ kG(t)

> 0;
and thus
dt
dpF
< 0;
dp
dpF
< 0 =) dR
dpF
  dC
dpF
< 0:
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3.6.4 Small FT market - xed p
We extend our analysis to the situation when the FT market is too small to impact the
world price p of co¤ee. For example, we may assume that there is a large number of regions,
but in only very few of them are farmers participating in Fair Trade. Middlemen, if present,
adjust to the FT market only if there are FT farmers in their region.
Lemma 14 If there are no middlemen, the Fair Trade market where the price is set to
clear the market always helps the farmers.
Proof. Since price p does not change, the number of active farmers G(p) does not change.
Those farmers who decide to sell on the FT market (G(p
F p
k ) of them) are all better o¤,
because they could have stayed in the non-FT market
In the world where the FT market clears, but there are middlemen, the situation is
slightly more complicated. Middlemen react to the FT market and thus alter the revenue of
non-FT farmers. However, we have shown before that all active farmers are strictly better
o¤ if the price pM increases and that this happens when p is not very sensitive to pF : We
can thus apply the same argument as in Lemma 9 here, because price p is assumed to be
xed. For xed p, the argument is very intuitive - middlemen increase price to attract more
farmers to o¤set the loss from those who left for the FT market. This increase in price helps
all non-FT farmers, but FT farmers are still better o¤ than non-FT ones.
Lemma 15 When the FT market clears, it helps all the farmers even if there are middle-
men.
Proof. See Lemma 9 and note that p is xed.
In the case of the FT market with price pF above market equilibrium (and thus  < 1),
but no middlemen, we will analyze the impact of a small increase in pF . Farmers benet if
the expected revenue, pF , increases. This happens when
@(pF )
@pF
=
@
@pF
pF +  > 0
@
@pF
>   
pF
:
We can use market equilibrium conditions to prove the following result.
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Lemma 16 Farmers benet from a marginal increase in pF if and only if
DF
pF
(p; pF )  2g(t)=k
G(t) + tg(t)
>   
pF
;
where t =  p
F p
k .
Proof. We use comparative statics to show that
DF (p; pF )  G(t) = 0
@
@pF
=
DF
pF
(p; pF )  2k g(t)
G(t) + tg(t)
< 0;
because DF
pF
< 0: From the previous discussion, we know that farmers benet from the FT
market if @
@pF
is large enough:
@
@pF
=
DF
pF
(p; pF )  2k g(t)
G(t) + tg(t)
>   
pF
:
The nal case, excess supply on the FT market and middlemen on the normal co¤ee
market, is slightly more complicated. Because of the middlemen, farmers dont get a xed
price p for their normal co¤ee but price pM that in general depends on the price pF : The
equilibrium condition on the FT market is
DF (p; pF ) = G
 
t0

;
t0 = 
pF   pM
k
:
Lemma 17 If middlemen never increase their price pM more than the price on the FT mar-
ket increased, @p
M
@pF
< 1; and they do not increase their price too much when the probability
of success on the FT market increases:
@pM
@
< k
t0
2

G(t0)
t0g(t0)
+ 1

;
then the probability of successful trade on the FT market decreases when the FT price in-
creases.
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Proof. We can again use the comparative statics argument to show
@
@pF
=
DF
pF
  2k g(t0)(1  @p
M
@pF
)
G(t0) + g(t0)

t0
   k @p
M
@
 :
Assuming that
@pM
@pF
< 1;
@pM
@
< k
t0
2

G(t0)
t0g(t0)
+ 1

;
and by observing that
G(t0) + g(t0)

t0

  
k
@pM
@

> 0 () @p
M
@
< k
t0
2

G(t0)
t0g(t0)
+ 1

;
we can conclude that @
@pF
< 0:
Note that this lemma also allows for the possibility that the probability of success on the
FT market () is locally increasing in pF : This happens when @p
M
@pF
is very large and such a
condition is rather intuitive. If middlemen increase the price relative to an increase in pF ,
it is possible that more FT farmers switch back to regular co¤ee production. However, this
e¤ect has to be stronger than a decrease in demand by FT co¤ee consumers. It is clear that
such a case is very unlikely.
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